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ABSTRACT

SATIRE AND SYNTHESIS: PARODY AND SATIRE OF VICTORIAN EDUCATION
IN THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL

by
Cameron David Sedlacek
March 2016

Education is an integral part of any society. Victorian England saw drastic reform
in the method of childhood education, shifting from religious to secular forms of rote
memorization. An analysis of the works of Lewis Carroll reveals significant instances of
parody, pastiche, and satire on these styles of education and their corresponding reform.
Unlike traditional satire, however, Lewis Carroll’s satire does not simply criticize these
targets, but utilizes a strategy of synthesis to illustrate strengths and weaknesses of
various conflicting educational ideologies and to suggest ways of adopting methods from
all available options.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The Life of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson
On July 4, 1862, Charles Dodgson made a fateful journey with Alice, Lorina, and
Edith Liddell, the three daughters of Henry Liddell, the Dean of Christ Church College,
Oxford. In an entry in his diary on this day, Dodgson writes, “I made an expedition up the
river to Godstow with the three Liddells . . . [o]n which occasion I told them the fairy-tale
of ‘Alice’s Adventures Underground,’ which I undertook to write out for Alice” (qtd.
Collingwood 93-94). Alice’s Adventures Underground would, of course, become Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland. Despite its origin in a very specific event, this story has
become one of the most far-reaching and iconic children’s tales in the English language.
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, perhaps better known by the penname Lewis
Carroll,1 was born on January 27, 1832, in the town of Daresbury. He was the third of
what would be eleven children, and the oldest son. Dodgson’s father, also named Charles
Dodgson, was incumbent of the parish of Daresbury, and this connection to religion
remained with the younger Charles throughout his lifetime. In 1843, the elder Charles
was appointed Archdeacon of Richmond, and the Dodgson family relocated to the
Rectory at Croft. The Rectory provided young Charles with the opportunity to explore his
role as educator and writer, where he took it upon himself, as the oldest male child, to
entertain his ten siblings. Dodgson wrote extensively while living at the Rectory,

Lewis Carroll is derived from Dodgson’s Christian names, Charles Lutwidge, Latinized, reversed, and rerendered into English (Gasson xix).
1
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producing plays that he performed in a marionette theatre he constructed himself and at
least eight periodicals, of which Charles was the editor and to which the rest of the
Dodgson family contributed. Some of Dodgson’s earliest literary works emerged from
this setting, in the form of periodicals written by and for members of the Dodgson family.
He used his large family as an audience for his literary works; this young, religious
audience informs the writing style that made Dodgson, under his penname Lewis Carroll,
famous. Of these collections, The Rectory Umbrella and Mischmasch are the most
significant; indeed, Mischmasch contains an early version of the Jabberwocky poem from
Through the Looking-Glass, complete with definitions for Carroll’s coined words.
In 1850, Dodgson matriculated at Christ Church College, Oxford. He would
remain at Christ Church until his death, forty-seven years later. In 1852, he was made a
Student, the Oxford equivalent of a Lecturer or Fellow, and in 1855, he was made a
“Master of the House,” which granted him all the privileges of a Master of Arts at Christ
Church College.2
The Claim of This Thesis
Dodgson’s decision to obey some of the religious regulations required of him and
ignore others, reflects a central aspect of the philosophy of Lewis Carroll: synthesis. My
goal in this thesis is to show how Carroll frequently utilizes parody and satire, not
typically, i.e. primarily as forms of criticism and attack, but rather as tools to suggest
synthesis, and through synthesis improvement, in and for education. Much of this
synthesis is made apparent through the use of nonsense,3 which is not a lack of sense but
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For a more detailed explanation of Dodgson’s Studentship, see Chapter IV of this thesis.
For an extensive explanation of the genre of nonsense, see Chapter II of this thesis.
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rather a call for response, demanding participation on the part of the reader in order to
create sense. Carroll uses these tools to reconcile figures, institutions, and modes of
thought traditionally believed, in Victorian England, to be in opposition. For example,
much of his parody and satire focus on educational institutions. This mockery,
nevertheless, provides readers with an alternative form of education, one based on
justification and understanding, rather than on the standard Victorian forms of
instruction, based on rote learning and memorization. Carroll extensively parodies
religious songs, poems, and nursery rhymes in both Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
and Through the Looking-Glass (which I hereafter collectively refer to as the Wonderland
texts). Carroll does not intend to criticize religion itself through his parodies (Carroll
considered himself a Christian), but rather to suggest a way of adapting the rigid, adult
world of religion to the mind of a child in ways that benefit children. Similarly, he
parodies memorization and rote learning not to condemn the dominant styles of Victorian
education directly, but rather to expose weaknesses in these forms of education and to
provide alternatives that are more suitable and beneficial to children and to the
educational system of Victorian England.
In essence, the Wonderland texts function as conduct books, while at the same
time parodying and satirizing the Victorian conduct book. This comic, “nonsensical”
style also engages readers in a way that reconciles the young mind of the original
audience with the adult mind of the author. Carroll wrote of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland that “[t]he why of this book cannot, and need not, be put into words. Those
for whom a child’s mind is a sealed book, and who see no divinity in a child’s smile
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would read such words in vain; while for anyone who has ever loved one true child, no
words are needed” (qtd. in Woollcott 8). Thus, the content of the Wonderland texts is not
without sense, as may first appear to an adult readership, but a combination of education,
imagination, parody, satire, and reference that works to suggest multiple new methods of
education for Victorian children. These methods provide explanation of answers, relate
new concepts to familiar concepts, and de-emphasize the rote learning and memorization
that dominated Victorian religious and secular institutions.
Scholarship on Lewis Carroll
Since its original publication in 1865, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland has been
a source of near-constant scholarship. In 1971, Robert Phillips compiled an anthology of
Carrollian scholarship, Aspects of Alice: Lewis Carroll’s Dreamchild as Seen through the
Critics’ Looking-Glasses. The variety of essays anthologized in this text exemplifies
Carrollian scholarship in the hundred years after the publication of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland. Ranging from biographical and historical evaluations of both Carroll and
the texts to essays on philosophy, psychoanalysis, parody and satire, and even
psychedelic interpretations, most of these essays deal, in some way, with the author’s
connection to his work. However, Donald Rackin’s “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night”
challenges this biographical focus.
First published in 1966, and winning the PMLA essay prize for that year, Rackin’s
article begins by addressing a central aspect of Carollian studies Rackin finds
problematic: the debate regarding the connection between Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland and its author and Victorian English culture:
4

In the century now passed since the publication of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, scores of critical studies have attempted to account for the
fascination the book holds for adult readers. Although some of these
investigations offer provocative insights, most of them treat Carroll in
specialized modes inaccessible to the majority of readers, and they fail to
view Alice as a complete and organic work of art. Hardly a single
important critique has been written of Alice as a self-contained fiction,
distinct from Through the Looking-Glass and all other imaginative pieces
by Carroll. (391)
Rackin believes that the majority of Carrollian scholarship assumes the text to be deeply
interwoven with the life of the author and with Victorian culture. As a result, the focus of
such scholarship tends to be on the author and his relationship with his culture, rather
than on the text itself. Rackin believes that the lack of focus on Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland as a single text detracts from its value as a work of art, and that this lack of
focus creates other problems:
Critics also tend to confuse Charles Dodgson the man with Lewis Carroll
the author; this tends to lead to distorted readings of Alice that depend too
heavily on the fact, say, that Dodgson was an Oxford don, or a
mathematician, or a highly eccentric Victorian gentleman with curious
pathological tendencies. The results are often analyses which fail to
explain the total work’s undeniable impact on the modern lay reader
unschooled in Victorian political and social history, theoretical
5

mathematics, symbolic logic, or Freudian psychology. It seems time, then,
that Alice be treated for what it most certainly is—a book of major and
permanent importance in the tradition of English fiction, a work that still
pertains directly to the experience of the unspecialized reader, and one that
exemplifies the profound questioning of reality which characterizes the
mainstream of nineteenth-century English literature. (391-92)
Rackin abandons the Carrollian tendency to attempt to explain the power of Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland by explaining the author and instead uses the text itself to
explain its legacy. His focus on Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as a single text,
isolated from historical and biographical contexts, marked a renewal in the debate over
the role of the authorial presence in text. His work has been used by Carrollian scholars
and educators as a method for a variety of purposes and has had a lasting impact on
Carrollian scholarship.
Rackin again contributed to Wonderland studies in 1976 with “Laughing and
Grief: What’s So Funny About Alice in Wonderland?” As with his previous essay,
Rackin reiterates his intent to treat Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as its own
individual text, separate from the author and from Through the Looking-Glass. However,
he devotes a significant portion of this essay to his belief that, while adults find this book
funny, many children find it frightening. A significant portion of this horror, according to
Rackin, stems from the illustrations; these often deal with polarities: “sense vs. nonsense,
consciousness vs. unconsciousness, waking vs. dreaming, reality vs. fantasy, adult vs.
child, narrator vs. protagonist, teller vs. doer, delight vs. fear, order vs. chaos, humor vs.
6

wit, and laughter vs. tears” (15). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland often reverses these
polarities or demolishes them altogether, either by adding additional options to the binary
pairs, which is often why such material is described as nonsense, or by blurring the
boundaries between them, thus illustrating Carroll’s strategy of synthesis. This
abandonment of binary oppositions is precisely what Carroll does in his own work in
order to provide an improved educational foundation for his child readers.
Following Rackin’s work in the 1960s and 70s, many Carrollian scholars focused
less on Charles Dodgson the author and more on the Wonderland texts’ connection to
their audience. In 1982, Nina Auerbach published “Falling Alice, Fallen Women, and
Victorian Dream Children,” in which she adopts a similar stance to Rackin’s. She begins
her essay by stating:
The prosaic but strangely haunting Alice we think we know was many
Alices from her inception. . . . [t]he child of the text, imperturbably
civilized yet uncannily adaptable, is still another being from the
inspirations and exegeses that surround her. Her aplomb makes her
unrecognizable as a child, but her cool response to flamboyant violence
makes her the ideal hostess for dreams and nightmares: effortlessly and
instinctively, she turns madness to etiquette. (46)
Auerbach chooses to compare Alice to both the general Victorian child and to the
Victorian woman, using Alice to evaluate widely held ideas and attitudes of Victorian
England. Her claim that Alice turns madness to etiquette parallels Carroll’s use of
nonsense to create education and, through education, knowledge.
7

In the same year, Mark Gabriele published “Alice in Wonderland: Problem of
Identity—Aggressive Content and Form Control” in which he relies both on “Alice’s
Journey to the End of Night” and on an earlier piece by Nina Auerbach, “Alice and
Wonderland: A Curious Child.” Gabriele describes how Alice’s actions in Wonderland
reflect her desire to avoid being caught in a position of ignorance, especially in terms of
social relationships: “Alice defines herself more from without than from within . . . [s]he
avoids contact with her own feelings, and looks toward rules to preserve her from threat”
(370). These rules that Alice so diligently attempts to follow were often taught to
Victorian schoolchildren through rhymes, poems, or stories, and this didactic children’s
literature is precisely what Lewis Carroll created with the original Wonderland story,
though the Wonderland texts are critical of the type of rote learning that these rhymes
embody. Responses to Rackin’s work were not always positive, however; in his 1986
essay “Alice as Self and Other: Experiences of Reading Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland,” Michael Steig criticizes Rackin’s dismissal of individual readers. He writes
that “Rackin is too generalizing about reading in a way that does not take into account the
variously disturbing and liberating aspects of the text for individual readers,” which, by
extension, would include Alice Liddell, whose relationship with Lewis Carroll as
storyteller mirrors that of student and teacher (180).
Towards the end of the twentieth century, Carrollian scholars developed a
renewed interest in anthologized responses to the Wonderland texts. Due to the extensive
response to “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night” in these anthologies, Donald Rackin
revisited his old essays in 1991 when he published Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland

8

and Through the Looking Glass: Nonsense, Sense, and Meaning. This book contains
“Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland: An Underground Journey to the End of Night,”
based on “Alice’s Journey to the End of Night,” and “Laughing and Grief: What’s So
Funny about the Alices?” based on “Laughing and Grief: What’s So Funny About Alice
in Wonderland?” Though he maintains most of his previous arguments, Rackin includes
both Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass in these analyses,
while his earlier work focused solely on the former. He also discusses the original written
tale, authored by Charles Dodgson for Alice Liddell and titled Alice’s Adventures under
Ground, admitting that the personal relationship between the two is evident in this edition
but that the general public is not familiar with Under Ground. Rackin, it appears, has
embraced the concept of synthesis that Lewis Carroll favored. Though Rackin’s new
collection contains the most recent versions of his essays, many Carrollian scholars still
cite the originals in their own work. Rackin’s anthology also coincided with a renewed
interest among Carollian scholars in the relationship between the Wonderland texts and
their Victorian readers, especially regarding the fluidity of this relationship.
Despite Rackin’s claim that most analyses of the works of Lewis Carroll are too
complex for lay readers, and thus of limited interest outside of academia, the texts
themselves remain significant. Jean-Jaques Lecercle claims that the Wonderland stories,
“in spite of the fact that they have been admitted into the canon of English Literature . . .
have managed to keep remarkably alive, far beyond the range of the professional interest
of academics” (1). The popularity of the original stories, as well as their pop-culture
adaptations, can be traced to their unusual style: the Wonderland books are frequently
9

described as “nonsense” texts. In his 1994 book Philosophy of Nonsense: The Intuitions
of Victorian Nonsense, Lecercle defines the specific genre of Victorian “nonsense” texts,
of which the Wonderland books are his primary example, emphasizing the inseparable
relationship between this genre and education.4
Referencing the work of both Auerbach and Rackin in his 1998 book Ventures
into Childland: Victorians, Fairy Tales, and Femininity, U. C. Knoepflmacher explores
how the life of Charles Dodgson, leading up to and briefly following the creation of the
Wonderland texts, relate to these two texts and how the two texts relate to each other. He
addresses the conflict among critics, including Rackin, about the relationship of Alice
Liddell to the character of Alice. Knoepflmacher notes that, although Alice Liddell was
twelve-and-a-half years old when she received the original manuscript of Alice’s
Adventures Under Ground, Dodgson included with the book a photograph of the young
girl at seven years old, the same age as her namesake character (168). Knoepflmacher
uses this photo to claim that Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland was written specifically
for Carroll’s ideal memory of the seven-year-old Alice Liddell, but, as Rackin had earlier
claimed, Through the Looking-Glass was written for an adult. This change in audience
explains one reason why Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland received far more criticism
than Through the Looking-Glass. However, Knoepflmacher neither claims that these texts
were written exclusively for children nor for adults. Similar to Rackin, he believes that
the texts themselves are important works of art, but unlike Rackin, he places a heavier
emphasis on their connection to author and culture, especially through parody and satire.
Rather than excluding possible interpretations, Knoepflmacher’s work embraces the idea
4

For an extensive analysis of Lecercle’s work, see Chapter II of this thesis.
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of a multitude of simultaneous, opposing interpretations—a truly Carollian style of
synthesis.
Modern Carrollian scholars continue to respond to these works, especially those
of Rackin and Auerbach. Brian Gibson addresses the difference between authorship and
authority, an issue Rackin explores in much of his own work, in his 2003 essay “‘Let’s
Consider Who It Was that Dreamed It All’: Looking Through the Refracted Glass of
Narrative at Authorship and Authority in Lewis Carroll’s Alice Books.” Gibson’s analysis
includes such questions as whether there is an ultimate authority, what determines
authority in Wonderland, and how Charles Dodgson, Lewis Carroll, Alice Liddell and the
titular character from the Wonderland texts all relate (these relationships often take the
form of parody). Unlike Rackin, Gibson believes that one cannot separate the author from
the text, much like Knoepflmacher, and that this relationship is invaluable to
understanding the text as a whole.
The issue of how much Dodgson/Carroll’s personal experiences influenced his
work is not the only significant aspect of Carrollian scholarship. Florence Milner’s 1903
essay, “The Poems in Alice in Wonderland” (reprinted in Aspects of Alice) is essential to
understanding the parody and satire present in the Wonderland texts. She writes of
Carroll’s masterpieces:
[T]hose who read the book when it was first published found in it a delight
which the child of today misses. Fifty years ago certain poems appeared in
every reader and were read over and over again until the child was stupid
indeed who did not unconsciously learn them by heart. Today there is a
11

new fashion in literature. Children are whirled from one supplementary
reader to another, conning graceful rhymes and pretty stories all illustrated
with pretty pictures, but the old things have passed away. All the poems in
Alice in Wonderland are parodies upon these once familiar rhymes.
Scattered lines of the poems cling to the minds of older people; they
remember being once familiar with them; they recognize the meter and
can sometimes repeat two or three opening lines, but the complete poem
eludes them, and the author they probably never did know. The children of
today do not know the verses at all, and . . . parody ceases to be parody
without the original poem as a background. (245-46)
Milner proceeds to cite eight instances where Carroll parodies a well-known (for 1865)
poem and then cites the original. A reader of the Wonderland texts must be familiar with
these originals in order to first understand that they are being parodied and then to
understand the purpose and meaning of the parody. In 1960, John Mackay Shaw
expanded upon Milner’s work, compiling a list of all of Carroll’s parodic poems and their
originals in both Wonderland texts. He classifies them as “fifteen recognized parodies of
then currently well-known poems, five other poems not so recognized, at least so far, and
four popular nursery rhymes” (1). This compilation is of vital importance to any study
that involves parody of poetry in the work of Lewis Carroll.
Will Brooker’s 2004 Alice’s Adventures: Lewis Carroll in Popular Culture
attempts to explain the continuing popularity of the works of Lewis Carroll by analyzing
Charles Dodgson the author, the works themselves, the illustrations, and various
12

adaptations of the Wonderland texts. He addresses one major complication with
Wonderland in popular culture: the general population is more familiar with the Disney
animated film than with the original book, though many critics disagree about whether
this has made a positive or negative impact on the value of the originals and on Carrollian
scholarship as a whole.
The 2000s also saw an increase in using Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland as an
educational tool. In 2005, Michael Mendelson published “Can We Learn Practical
Judgement? Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and the Quest for Common Sense.” In this
essay, he adopts several aspects from Rackin’s work. First, Mendelson writes that, when
he as a professor introduces Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to his students, he finds
that they often know the basic story but not the text. Many students know the text only
through more recent adaptations of the story, such as the Disney animated film, or have
vague memories of reading or being read the original novel, but no solid knowledge of
the text itself. Mendelson finds that this lack of familiarity with details presents his class
with both positive and negative effects on reading the story: with no previous experience,
students can read the novel as an individual text, as Rackin suggests, but they often
discuss their experiences and opinions when students encounter passages that differ from
what they expect or remember. Because of this fresh view of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, Mendelson and his students may treat Alice as a person rather than as a
character. This allows for Alice’s experiences with judgment, logic, and identity to be
evaluated on psychological and educational levels, in addition to the literary level.
Mendelson expands on his earlier work in his 2007 essay, “The Phenomenology of Deep
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Surprise in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland,” but this time he strays from Rackin’s
work, choosing to focus on emotion rather than logic. Mendelson also utilizes
bibliographic aspects of both Lewis Carroll and Alice Liddell, something Rackin’s early
work criticized, to explain how the character Alice’s emotional responses are both natural
and appropriate for a Victorian child. Because of the continuing debate over the
importance of authorial and cultural relationship to the texts, contemporary Carrollian
scholarship continues to maintain an interest in the relationship between the Wonderland
texts, education, and Victorian England.
Because the history of scholarship on the works of Lewis Carroll is so long and
varied, it is necessary for this thesis to limit its focus to major scholarship pertaining to
education and parody. These analyses all focus on the Wonderland texts’ relationship (or
lack thereof) with Victorian culture, mostly through Carroll’s parody and satire. They
also include exploration of the character Alice’s education throughout Wonderland.
However, with the exception of Lecercle, these scholars fail to connect Alice’s education
to the educational systems of Victorian England. My work explores how Carroll’s
parody, satire, and pastiche focus on Wonderland education, not for the purposes of direct
attack or condemnation, but to reveal flaws and to synthesize various methods of
education for the benefit of mid-nineteenth century children..
The analysis of the works of Lewis Carroll are divided into five sections. Chapter
II defines the genre of nonsense and the methods through which Victorian nonsense
parodies and satirizes its source culture. This chapter also illustrates the extent to which
nonsense and education are related. Chapter III explores Lewis Carroll’s educational
14

beliefs, by examining his texts, the prefaces to these texts, and his personal
correspondences. Chapter IV examines how the works of Lewis Carroll satirize Victorian
religious education without criticizing religion, with emphasis on his satire of rote
learning and of uncompromising dogma. Chapter V reinforces Carroll’s parody and satire
of rote learning, this time through an evaluation of Victorian schoolroom education. This
chapter also explains Carroll’s satire of Victorian educators by revealing common trends
in Victorian educators’ hiring and educational requirements. Chapter VI connects
Carroll’s strategy of synthesis to the interactive nature of education, explaining the
importance of such synthesis in modern education. Each of these chapters evaluates
instances of parody, pastiche, and satire within the texts and links these instances with
their Victorian counterparts. In doing so, Lewis Carroll’s satire of Victorian education,
not for the purposes of attack or critique but for education, improvement, and synthesis,
is revealed.

15

CHAPTER II
INTRODUCTION TO AND DEFINITION OF NONSENSE

Nonsense is a central concept to the Wonderland texts. Alice herself exclaims
“Stuff and nonsense” when the Queen, during the courtroom scene in Alice’s Adventures
in Wonderland, tells the court to decide on a sentence before the verdict (129). The work
of linguist and philosopher of language Jean-Jacques Lecercle on nonsense as a genre,
specifically Victorian nonsense, is integral to this thesis and its analysis of the
Wonderland texts. His work helps to explain the significant connection between nonsense
and education, how this connection works to satirize Victorian education, and how this
connection illustrates Carroll’s strategy of synthesis.
Nonsense texts are often described as such not because of a total lack of sense, but
because there is a multiplicity of answers, interpretations, and/or explanations of the
content, all existing simultaneously and often in opposition to each other. Lecercle writes
of the genre of nonsense that “the persistence of its mythical power is due to the quality
of the intuitions, linguistic, pragmatic, and philosophical, embedded in the text” (2).
Lewis Carroll provides an example of the multiplicity of interpretations of nonsense
texts, when he writes of “The Hunting of the Snark”:
As to the meaning of the Snark, I’m very much afraid I didn’t mean
anything but nonsense! Still, you know, words mean more than we mean
to express when we use them; so a whole book ought to mean a great deal
more than the writer means. So, whatever good meanings are in the book,
16

I’m glad to accept as the meaning of the book. The best that I’ve seen is
by a lady, that the whole book is an allegory on the search after happiness.
I think this fits in beautifully in many ways. (qtd. in Collingwood 173)
Carroll embraces interpretations that differ from his intent; he meant “nonsense” but
accepts sense as a meaning for his book. His use of the term “nonsense,” then, conveys
far more than a simple lack of intended meaning; rather, he uses “nonsense” to mean a
multiplicity of possible meanings, which are up to the reader, not the author, to
determine. There are, however, limitations to interpretations of nonsense texts. While
Carroll champions the idea that a single situation may possess multiple correct responses,
he does not believe that every response is correct. Responses must be logically justified,
because, as Lecercle observes, “even a nonsense text can be interpreted wrongly, against
the grain of its sense” (18). This is where Charles Dodgson the logician appears in the
work of Lewis Carroll. His nonsense texts do not create meaning; rather, they create the
opportunity for meaning. This opportunity has been described, by Lecercle, as the
polyphony of nonsense: “[b]ecause the text says nothing, the empty shells of discourse
multiply, and the text says everything, becoming the bearer of a potential infinity of
meaning . . . there is a specific receptiveness of nonsense texts, which is the mirror image
of their semantic emptiness” (191). The true meaning, or rather value, of nonsense texts
lies in their readers’ response, in the dialogue created between the author, the text, and
various readers. This value reflects Charles Dodgson’s role as a logic instructor and
explains the position of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland in the English canon: it is the
archetype of Victorian nonsense, but an archetype that includes not only the original
17

publication but the entire body of work, reproduction, commentary, and evaluation, that
has risen out of the original text.
In his 1994 book Philosophy of Nonsense: The Intuitions of Victorian Nonsense,
Lecercle defines the concept of nonsense as a genre and as a “chronotope.” He borrows
the term chronotope from Mikhail Bakhtin, and Lecercle, despite claiming “its meaning
is so wide as to defy precise definition,” explains the term as
denot[ing] the intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships
that are expressed in literature, something like literary forms of intuition.
This, for Bakhtin, is the locus for the relationship between the work of art
and reality, which goes beyond simple mimesis. . . . [T]here is no simple
reflection of reality in the work of art, but there is no linguistic closure
either. . . . Bakhtin has a distinction between propositions, which exist in
langue as potentialities of meaning, and utterances, which actualize those
potentialities in a given situation or conjuncture. The failure of structural
linguistics, and of formalism, is due to their choice of propositions as
objects of study. This makes them miss the polyphony of texts. Only the
utterance has full meaning, and its structure, its relationship with the
context of utterance, with reality, is given by the chronotope. Envisaged in
this way, the chronotope is not a reflection (of a historical period, of the
Zeitgeist), but rather the locus for the plurality of voices and points of
view to develop. Language, Bakhtin says, is not only a system of abstract
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grammatical categories, but also an “ideologically saturated” worldview.
(168)
The chronotope of Victorian nonsense, then, is not limited to a single ideological point of
view, but the locus of all potential ideologies and of their implementation in Victorian
culture. In Victorian England, this locus often materialized in educational institutions.
The enduring popularity of the works of Lewis Carroll is, per Lecercle, due in part to this
chronotope of Victorian nonsense. The term “nonsense” and its continuing interest, both
academic and popular, are closely related but problematic; the negative prefix “non-” in
“nonsense” is part of this reason:
non-sense is to be taken not so much as the trace of a cognitive judgment,
(“I assert that there is no sense in this text”) but rather as an elliptic
exclamative, calling for dialogic response. Not so much the recognition of
an absence as the defiant and provisional formulation of a value
judgement, calling for contradictory response, as when Alice, irritated
beyond what she can possibly bear by the Wonderland characters’ quirks
and absurdities, exclaims: “Stuff and nonsense!” This is no absence of
sense but a calling for the sense that the answer will provide—in this,
literary nonsense is only the manifest staging of the language game of
sense, at least as defined by Bakhtin: “sense can be assimilated in
response. It is always the answer to a question.” (Lecercle 180)
The nonsense in nonsense texts, then, requires a response, either on the part of Alice, the
Wonderland residents, or the narrator. The nonsense of nonsense texts also calls for a
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response on the part of the reader. Readers want to take part in Alice’s conversations with
the Wonderland residents, but because this is an impossible task, they create real-world
counterparts to the Wonderland conversation, discussing these situations with other
readers. Additionally, younger audiences would be likely to ask questions of their own,
prompting responses and justifications that would mimic the young Liddell children
asking for explanations from Charles Dodgson on that fateful river journey.
Nonsense, in the works of Lewis Carroll, is not a lack of sense. It is more than
that. Because Carroll emphasizes a multiplicity of possible meanings, and then a
synthesis of these meanings and their justifications, nonsense as a genre is not the same
as nonsense as a single word. Lecercle emphasizes that the negative prefix in the word
nonsense “is the mark of a process not merely of denial but also of reflexivity, that nonsense is also metasense. Nonsense texts are reflexive texts . . . Nonsense texts are not
explicitly parodic, they turn parody into a theory of serious literature” (2). Such parody is
central to nonsense texts, and is closely linked to nonsense as a chronotope. Expanding
on this claim, Lecercle defines a diachrony of nonsense, which he divides into three
aspects. First,
Nonsense has an intertext—it is a characteristic of nonsense texts that they
are always secondary, always after-the-event rewritings of other texts,
hence the importance of parody in the genre. The chronotope emerges in
this distance between the nonsense text and the text it parodies (169)
Such a focus on parody means that nonsense texts are invariably tied to the history and
culture of the texts. Rather than being a simple relationship between parody and its target,
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nonsense incorporates everything in between, including the institutions, responses, and
recreations of both the parody and its target. Second, “[n]onsense also has a tradition—a
mythical, fictitious tradition, created a posteriori (like all traditions) to justify the texts, to
organize their polyphony into a mythical chronology” (169). Such traditions are common
in nonsense texts, and integral to the genre. Readers frequently the Victorian inspirations
for various Wonderland characters, if there even were any (Carroll has explicitly stated,
for example, that he was the Dodo), or the answer to the Hatter’s riddle. These examples
are used to define nonsense, but like the chicken and the egg, nonsense defines these
examples, exemplifying nonsense texts’ propensity for paradox. Third,
nonsense texts are the locus for a polyphony of discourses: this
multiplicity of voices refracts (to use Bakhtin’s term, which he carefully
distinguishes from ‘reflects’) the historical conjuncture, by anchoring
nonsense in ideology and its apparatuses. The result of this diachronic
study is that nonsense will appear in the light of a narrative, in the sense
of Lyotard. (169)
Nonsense texts are always connected, in some way, to information that readers would
already be familiar with. They are never completely devoid of sense; there is always
some connection, something familiar in them, and readers strive to discover and explain
this connection. Nonsense texts do not seek to supplant or devalue parodied texts, but
rather to complement them. The act of refraction in nonsense literature both imitates but
at the same time alters the targets of parody, whether they be other texts (pastiche) or
constituted discourses (ideology), creating a similar but distinct version of the source
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(Lecercle 210). The nonsense nature of these new texts, in the works of authors like
Lewis Carroll, are not meant purely as comedy or entertainment; they serve both
pragmatic and pedagogic purposes. The act of refraction also “is not merely distortion,
but also inscription. A nonsense text literally inscribes other texts through ironic
quotation—this is the distance of parody . . . it is because nonsense inscribes texts that it
inscribes reality—in the guise of discourses” (Lecercle 169-70). In fact, nonsense texts
are often so successful at creating meaning that they become more popular, more familiar
to their readers than the source texts. Thus, the works of Lewis Carroll represent not
simply nonsense as a genre, but the chronotope of Victorian English nonsense. The
chronotope of Carroll’s nonsense is unique in its construction, even among other
nonsense texts; most nonsense texts place fictional characters in factual locations, but
Wonderland places fictional characters in a fictional location. As such, parody becomes
integral to the Wonderland texts even more than in other nonsense texts, and parodies
“are the privileged locus for the dialogue between the author and his child readers,” who
would be familiar with the Victorian counterpart (Lecercle 170). The abstract nature of
Wonderland (which many have described as nonsense) thus becomes centrally concerned
with parody. Rather than a geographic parody, Wonderland is a linguistic parody; the
primary focus, then, of the Wonderland parodies becomes not the source of parody but its
function. Readers of the Wonderland texts must understand the purpose and function of
parodies, such as Carroll’s strategy of synthesis, and not simply identify the source text.
They must then take it a step further and engage themselves in synthesizing, creating
new, often anachronistic interpretations of the Wonderland texts and the targets of their
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satire that, according to the genre of Victorian nonsense, are both not the intended
meaning (not the expected sense) and at the same time possible valid interpretations.
Another significant detail of nonsense literature as a genre is its denial of
metaphor. Rather than obscuring meaning, nonsense literature focuses on literal
interpretations: “rejection of metaphor is another characteristic of the [nonsense] genre.
Or, rather, it is the logical consequence of the avoidance of semantic anomaly. . . .
nonsense texts seem to deploy complex and ingenious strategies in order to avoid
metaphors” (Lecercle 63). A major goal of nonsense literature is to have its readers create
their own meaning, based on justification. The ambiguous nature of metaphor denies
readers the ability to create their own meaning, instead relying on the author’s intended
meaning of the metaphor.
Nonsense literature, especially that of Lewis Carroll, utilizes four strategies,
identified by Lecercle, that nonsense texts employ to avoid the ambiguity of metaphor:
literalism, coinage, incongruity of sentences, and the use of puns instead of metaphors.
The first strategy, literalism, is accomplished through tautology. This repetition of words
often appears in the form of excessively detailed, repetitive lists. The second strategy,
coinage, is the creation of new words, such as in the “Jabberwocky” poem. These coined
words must be explained arbitrarily, as is the case with both Humpty Dumpty in Through
the Looking-Glass and with Carroll himself, in the preface to later editions of the text,
and these arbitrary explanations negate metaphorical interpretation. In fact, Humpty
Dumpty’s explanation of these coined words created a now-standard linguistic formation:
the portmanteau-word. Portmanteau-words
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embody the contradiction which is central to nonsense. On the one hand,
they conform to structural or formal regularity, belonging as they do to
identifiable parts of speech and filling the correct syntactic slots. On the
other hand they are also the bearers of semantic excess, of two meanings
packed up into one word, and of formal irregularity, which ends up
producing a semantic void, since, not conforming to the structural
necessity of a homophonous string, their structure is impossible to
determine without the help of an authorized commentary. (Lecercle 47-48)
Coined words can also be problematic; one can never be certain whether a word is an
original creation of the author or is simply an outdated or specialized term that the reader
is simply unfamiliar with (Lecercle 29). As such, coined words embody a major paradox
of nonsense literature: they may mean both what the characters and readers believe they
mean (the correct meaning in the text) while possibly having a different meaning (correct
in the real world) existing simultaneously. The third strategy, incongruity of sentences,
removes the logical link between said sentences. With no link between their content,
these sentences must be interpreted literally, in isolation from the rest of the text. As
such, they cannot be part of a larger metaphor, for there is no link between these
sentences (and thus between their meaning). The final strategy, the avoidance of
metaphor completely by replacing metaphor with puns, is perhaps the most obvious
strategy in the Wonderland texts. Though puns are similar to metaphors, nonsense
authors like Carroll are aware of this similarity, and choose to use notoriously simple
puns, often in pairs or in a series (such as with the mouse, and Carroll’s use of tail/tale
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and not/knot), to remove as much possibility of metaphorical interpretation as they can
(Lecercle 63-68). Carroll’s frequent punning, then, like the frequency of
explanation/justification, represents nonsense texts’ propensity for the multiplicity of
language. Through such multiplicity, various meanings can be synthesized, and punned
words like the previously mentioned tail/tale and not/knot become simultaneously
accurate (in their pronunciation) and inaccurate (in their spelling); neither is fully correct
nor incorrect, and neither option completely negates the other from also being correct or
incorrect.
Another reason for the enduring popularity of the Wonderland texts is that
nonsense texts “mimic the activities of literary critics and philosophers . . . In so doing
they express intuitions that often escape more serious practitioners of the art. They also,
of course, fail to produce the same result—a coherent interpretation of the text being
read” (Lecercle 5-6). This paradox illustrates how the parody and satire of Lewis Carroll
often exposes extremely specific intuitions about the objects of his parody and satire, but
at the cost of a seemingly fragmented, or nonsensical, narrative. This fragmented nature
has led many Carrollian scholars to refer to the Wonderland texts as a form of Menippean
satire,5 though Lecercle believes that this label is only paradoxically accurate:
there must be, and there cannot be, a filiation between Menippean satire
and nonsense. There must be, because the universe described, the universe
of carnival, is the same, and nonsense is the forgetful heir of a certain type
of medieval literature (the texts that are closest to Victorian nonsense, true
M. Keith Booker defines Menippean satire as a genre “associated by Mikhail Bakhtin with carnivalesque
qualities in literature. Menippean satires tend to explore both fundamental philosophical ideas and
controversial current events. They combine naturalistic detail with fantastic images” (482).
5
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nonsense avant la lettre, are the French fatrasies). And there cannot be,
not only because no concrete historical filiation can be traced, but because
the contextual meaning of the same elements has radically changed—there
is, for instance, nothing revolutionary about the topsy-turvy world of
Victorian nonsense, and no attempt at sacrilege. (195)
Paradoxes such as this are a major part of nonsense literature, and, in keeping with the
nature of nonsense literature, both contradicting aspects exist simultaneously. Nonsense
literature is not even a subtype of Menippean satire; Lecercle describes nonsense more as
a parody of the basis for Menippean satire:
Nonsense is not even a de-semanticised, non-political version of
Menippean satire—it is rather the mythical repetition of the literature of
carnival. Bakhtin reaches the same conclusion for the dialogic novel: the
field of contemporary literature is strewn with the rubble of what he calls
medieval or Renaissance “grotesque realism.” Like the dialogic novel, but
more insistently, nonsense has used this for its building materials. (195)
Similar to much of his parody, Lewis Carroll utilizes not a single literary source but
multiple sources to create his nonsense. He relies on certain aspects of Menippean satire,
such as an episodic structure and an abundance of food and drink, but at the same time
ignores others, like the negative criticism associated with traditional parody. In this sense,
Victorian nonsense literature can be seen as a kind of parody, or rather pastiche, of
Menippean satire.
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Unlike traditional satire, such as the aforementioned Menippean satire, Carroll’s
parody, satire, and pastiche are more positive in their function, offering supplementary
insights or solutions rather than simple criticism or direct attack. In this sense, nonsense
differs from traditional definitions of parody and satire; Northrop Frye, for example, uses
the term “attack” in Anatomy of Criticism to describe targets of satire. Nonsense
literature, however, maintains a reverence for the source material; its goal is to strengthen
and support the original text by providing new possibilities. It is “deeply respectful of
authority in all its forms: rules of grammar, maxims of conversation and of politeness, the
authority of the canonical author of the parodied text,” and therefore is not meant as an
opposition but rather as a complement (Lecercle 3). Carroll’s strategy of synthesis allows
for readers to combine the original source and the parody to create new alternatives, new
meanings. Thus, though there are many instances of nonsense in the Wonderland texts
that readers and/or characters find difficult to understand due to certain aspects of
nonsense, these instances are grammatically correct and often deal with proper Victorian
rules of conduct—the overly-moralizing Duchess is a perfect example. The parody of
nonsense is not identical to traditional parody, however. Lecercle provides an explanation
of these two types of parody:
The first is parody proper: if I may say so, a textual intertext, ascribed by
an erudite footnote to a specific author. The second is pastiche, where the
ascription of authorship is blurred or impossible, where the parodic
distance is even greater—pastiche is the parody of a parody, where the
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style, the clichés, the slips of the pen are recognized as somehow “other,”
but no name can be given to this other. (170)
Lecercle provides several reasons for this otherness—in many instances, Carroll
simultaneously parodies multiple authors, or even genres, so that there is no single source
of his parody. This lack of a single source conforms to his fondness for multiplicity and
his preference for (logical) justification and exemplifies his love of synthesis. As
Florence Milner noted: “[t]he children of today [i.e., 1903] do not know the verses at all,
and as a parody ceases to be a parody without the original poem as a background, the
trouble of gathering these originals seems worth while” (246). Thus, a reader must be
familiar with both the parody and the parodied source, or risk mistaking parody for
pastiche or original work. Lecercle further explains the difference between parody and
pastiche. Traditional parody operates according to specific rules:
The advantage of parody is that we know where we are. In this it is like
irony, at least according to the trivial definition (irony is the inversion of
meaning). Once we have grasped the language game we are in, meaning
becomes easy to compute, through a maxim of parody or irony, which
gives rise to implicatures. The text works according to recognizable
dichotomies: parodying/parodied, comic/serious; in it a voice can be
heard, which controls the meaning, the voice of the author.
However, such dichotomies conflict with Carroll’s strategy of synthesis and with the
multiplicity of meaning inherent in nonsense literature. Therefore, according to Lecercle,
the works of Lewis Carroll are more than simple parodies:
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Carroll’s text goes further than [parody], into what I call pastiche. . . .
[T]he sheer excess of Carroll’s verve . . . is what subverts the unifying
control of the authorial voice, what liberates the multiplicity of discourses.
This is the pasta of pastiche: an ungodly and excessive mixture, the source
of a textual fuite en avant whereby the text escapes the control of the
speaker and words take over. (172)
This distinction means that nonsense parodies separate the theme of parody from the
variations of pastiche. However, these parodies “are always the locus of a multiplication
of words, discourses, or points of view. In fact, all nonsense texts—this is a defining
characteristic of the genre—are parodies in this sense” (Lecercle 173). There is never one
single source, one single meaning, one single purpose for nonsense texts. These sources
are not random either; the voices that comprise the pastiche are “[n]ot a babble of inane
voices, but a polyphony of historically relevant, because historically constituted,
discourses,” representing the chronotope of Victorian nonsense (Lecercle 177). In
essence, Carroll synthesizes parody, pastiche, and satire in his work, so that all are
present, yet the borders between these literary strategies are so blurred that readers can
rarely identify precisely where one ends and another begins. As a result, these readers
feel a sense of familiarity with the Wonderland texts, and are constantly striving to
discover and explain precisely where this familiarity lies.
The justification or explanation of nonsense is not the only process by which
nonsense texts create meaning. A nonsense text also “plays within the bounds of common
sense in order to remain within view of them, even if it has crossed to the other side of
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the frontier; but it does not seek to limit the text’s meaning to one single interpretation—
on the contrary, its dissolution of sense multiplies meaning” (Lecercle 20). When
Lecercle uses the word “sense” here, he does not mean it as any or all meaning, but rather
the expected, established meaning of such situations. Lecercle gives the example of the
Hatter’s riddle “Why is a raven like a writing-desk?” Because it has no given answer, the
riddle appears to contain no sense, because a riddle traditionally has an answer, but in
actuality this riddle has no single answer—any appropriately, i.e. logically, justified
response to this riddle is correct, according the rules of nonsense. Lecercle explains,
This is an interesting case of saying without meaning. Of course, both
Carroll and the Hatter know what the words mean, but in an important
sense they do not know what the utterance means. Worse even, both
speakers do not want to know what it means—they want it not to mean,
what they mean is not to mean.
This is another example of how nonsense literature mimics the actions of literary critics.
Critics, like Carroll’s readers, understand the meaning of the individual words, but do not
understand the meaning of the entire text. However, unlike most traditional authors, the
Hatter (and by extension Carroll) does not intend a specific meaning. Rather, he intends
to create dialogue regarding the riddle itself, placing focus not on the expected answer
but on the justification, the conversation, involved in arriving at an answer. Such literary
nonsense “is a scandalous object, which must be reduced by an ascription of meaning: a
riddle must have a solution” (Lecercle 119). The expected, pre-existing answer to the
riddle is not the point; the concept that it does not require an answer (or rather knowledge
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of the pre-existing answer) is the main idea of this infamous passage. It does not lack
sense because of the speaker’s failure in the use of language, but rather the intent of the
speaker(s) causes the non-sense nature of the conversation. Without a definitive answer,
the riddle has no closure, and thus the dialogue, the synthesis of possible responses,
remains forever open.
On the surface, the Wonderland texts appear to show Alice free of the constraints
of Victorian society and education, and thus the rules of language, but Lecercle believes
this viewpoint to be “a partial and therefore a naïve conception of nonsense. . . .
[nonsense] is a kind of textual doublebind, or paradox. It is both free and constrained. It
tells the reader to abide, and not to abide, by the rules of language” (25). While many
passages from the Wonderland texts appear to contain no sense, these passages still
follow the carefully constructed rules of language, while modifying their application.
Language is a living entity; words continuously enter and leave the standard lexicon,
even when such words are grammatically incorrect. It is up to speakers of the language to
accept these new words as possible, to synthesize them with what they already know
about the language, and turn such “non-sense” into sense.
The Paradox of Nonsense
Paradox is a central aspect of nonsense literature. Because of the multiplicity of
meanings, contradictory responses can exist simultaneously. The words “tale” and “tail”
are both written differently and spoken identically, both the same and different. Such
paradoxes are not limited to the use of language, but to the rules themselves. Lecercle
notes that nonsense contains situations where the rules of language are subverted; the
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apparent paradox in nonsense can be accounted for in terms of the “dialectic of excess
and lack” (3). Nonsense texts provide readers with a certain freedom from some of the
restricting aspects of language while at the same time remaining largely within the safe
boundaries of understandability. In Lecercle’s words, the “lack of structure at one level . .
. is amply compensated by an excess of structure at other levels . . . Lack of sense here is
always compensated by excess or proliferation of sense there. This . . . is the central
paradox, or contradiction, of the genre” (31). As such, while a multiplicity of meanings
exist, they are not all equally valid: some are more accurate, more justifiable, more
probable than others. In the Wonderland texts, nonsense often appears through an excess
of justification to compensate for a lack of truth or knowledge (i.e. the Duchess’
moralizing, where her justification, her logical argumentation, is true, but based on
flawed premises). Nonsense literature is, nearly always, accurate linguistically; it is only
flawed semantically (Lecercle 33). The “Jabberwocky” poem is an excellent example of
this dialectic. A significant aspect of the linguistic accuracy of nonsense literature is its
focus on syntax: “[n]onsense texts strictly conform to the rules of syntax—we may even
go further, and note that they relish their syntax. I have called this hypersyntaxism. Even
paradoxes are expressed through canonic sentence structures” (Lecercle 58). While there
are many instances where Alice fails to fully understand Wonderland dialogue, such as
with the “Jabberwocky” poem, she is sure that such dialogue is still spoken according to
proper linguistic rules. As such, Alice and the Wonderland residents, like Humpty
Dumpty, are able to extrapolate possible meanings for the words based on both logic and
linguistics.
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While the multiplicity of explanations in nonsense literature may appear to create
chaos, it in fact relishes order. Nonsense literature is a syntactic genre, where “syntax
plays with semantics. It compensates and exposes semantic incoherence. . . . The formal
excess of syntax compensates for a semantic (material) lack, or incoherence” (Lecercle
59-60). Thus, the Wonderland texts appear to focus on logic, justification, and rules and
regulations because they must, in order to compensate for aspects of the situation that
appear to be nonsense because they have no Victorian counterpart, or where the Victorian
counterpart is completely different. The tea-party is a perfect example of this; in
Wonderland, the tea-party lasts forever, but in Victorian England, tea-time lasts for only a
short part of each day (though one could argue that it indeed does last forever, because it
takes place every day, and will continue to do so). Readers must learn to understand
unfamiliar material, and an excess of justification, or adherence to standard rules,
compensates for a lack in familiar concepts or situations. This dialectic between excess
and lack is not the only contradiction present in nonsense literature, for
nonsense as a genre is the weaving together, into a tradition, of two
different, even opposed, threads, one literary, the other folkloric, one
poetic, the other childish, one “high,” the other “low.” The opposed
threads produce naturally dialogic, or contradictory, texts—texts that
capture this contradiction in some sort of unstable and provisional unity.
In nonsense this dialectic of monologism and dialogism is inscribed in the
very name of the genre. (Lecercle 179-80)
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These descriptions, however, are still rooted in binary oppositions. Lewis Carroll does
not simply relish in the contradiction, he synthesizes them, utilizing pastiche so that the
Wonderland texts, while appearing to be “low,” have entered the “high” canon of English
literature. These texts are simultaneously “high” and “low” while at the same time being
(completely) neither. The relation of the literary to the folkloric is precisely why
nonsense utilizes parody and satire to such a wide extent—material previously considered
“high,” such as canonical literature or educational and religious texts are combined with
the “low,” or common realm. In fact, after the Romantic revival of popular culture, such
low literature became the “monuments of the English national past,” being texts that, due
to their low nature, escaped the cultural domination of invading cultures such as the
French (Lecercle 180-81). Lecercle is also careful to note that “nonsense is not merely a
linguistic genre, one which is highly preoccupied with language, but also a pragmatic
genre” (71). Alice, and by extension readers of her adventures, is not meant only to be
entertained, she is meant to learn from Wonderland experiences, to apply these
combinations of education and folklore to her own life, i.e. life in Victorian England.
Nonsense in Relation to Education
Because of the pragmatic and pedagogic nature of nonsense literature, such texts
are especially concerned with education. Nonsense as a genre emerged in the Victorian
era because nonsense texts “attempt to solve by imaginary means a real contradiction in
the historical conjuncture” (Lecercle 2). Many critics downplay the connection between
the Wonderland texts and Victorian England, but certain aspects of Victorian education
are essential to nonsense literature as a genre. The rapid industrialization and
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urbanization of Victorian England led to an influx of school-age children who needed an
education. While, in the early nineteenth century, schools were controlled primarily by
religious organizations, laws such as the 1870 Education Act (passed between the
publication of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass) gave
control of many English educational institutions to secular, government organizations.
Thus, Victorian education lies at the heart of Lecercle’s “historical conjuncture” of
nonsense:
nonsense as a genre is a by-product of the development of the institution
of the school, that [nonsense] texts provide an imaginary solution to the
real contradiction between the urge to capture an ever wider proportion of
the population for the purpose of elementary schooling, and the resistance,
religious, political, and psychological, that such a cultural upheaval
inevitably arouses. (4)
Yet again, nonsense literature embodies a contradiction, a paradox, being an imaginary
solution to a real problem, while providing a solution that large portions of the population
refuse to embrace. Nonsense literature, however, is not intended at these populations, the
status quo, usually involved in the bureaucracy of Victorian England, but rather at the
child, who has not yet been indoctrinated into the traditional ideologies:
The school is the institution that develops the need for meaning and a
reflexive attitude towards language, and channels them in socially
acceptable ways. The school is the institution where not only rules of
grammar, but also maxims of good behavior, linguistic and otherwise, are
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learnt. . . . [N]onsense texts aim at (and choose their characters from) the
type of child who has not yet been captured by the institution . . .[,] little
girls in the case of Carroll[,] . . . and the school as theme is present in
nonsense texts . . . [N]onsense reflects the changing state of schooling; it
also phrases the resistance to this change. (Lecercle 4)
Major religious organizations of the latter half of the nineteenth century, then, were no
longer solely in control of teaching children rules of morality, behavior, and propriety.
Such institutions maintained a dogmatic approach to these rules, refusing to compromise,
to adapt, even in the face of the overwhelming changes of the mid-19th century. Several
major organizations were pitted against each other to gain control over education:
The School in Victorian Britain is a complex arrangement of institutions,
the result of a compromise between (a) the state, whose responsibilities in
the field of education have begun to increase; (b) the various churches
who compete between themselves, with the help of the state (but also, to a
certain extent, against its intervention) for the traditional right to educate
the masses; and (c) the lay reformers, the founders of modern educational
institutions, often Utilitarians or Benthamites, who criticise the inadequacy
of the system, which fails to prepare the students for the tasks the
economy demands. (Lecercle 218)
As both a man educated in this system and an educator forced to deal with the conflicts of
interest between these groups, Charles Dodgson was intimately aware of the various
groups and methods for education. As such, in the Wonderland texts, he compromises
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and synthesizes between these in his work, pointing out strengths, weaknesses, and areas
of overlap between such organizations and methods, allowing for a synthesis of such
conflicting viewpoints. Rather than choosing one group to support or criticize, Carroll
utilizes nonsense literature, and by extension his strategy of synthesis described in this
thesis, to make his readers aware of the possibility of religious and political freedom or
resistance, the need to not simply obey but to understand when and why one must obey,
and when to reject or embrace change. People of Victorian England were beginning to
experience these new situations, and in this capacity, nonsense
fulfills, in classic Marxist terms, an ideological function. It has no
ideology itself (there is no specific ideological position defended in
nonsense texts) but it is one of the vectors of Victorian ideology, one of
the forms through which, with certain ideological apparatuses, the
Victorians experienced an imaginary relationship with the real conditions
of their lives. (Lecercle 195)
Thus, the relationship between Victorian readers and nonsense texts is vital to the
evolution of Victorian culture. Nonsense literature allowed Victorian readers to confront
aspects of their lives while at the same time distance themselves from conflict. The
nonsense of Lewis Carroll, because it is targeted towards Victorian youth, helps prepare
the future Victorian England to better deal with these relationships.
Because of the increasing number of children attending public school, education
in Victorian England became increasingly more important. Lecercle uses the term
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“institution of nonsense” to describe the relationship between nonsense texts and
Victorian educational institutions:
nonsense texts are an integral part of a complex Victorian arrangement, or
social apparatus, which we will call “the School” for short—an
arrangement of spaces (the buildings and grounds), bodies (the scholars
and the teachers), books (the textbooks), discourses (at the school and
about the school), and texts (Tom Brown’s Schooldays, but also Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland, as well as innumerable “primers”). Because
nonsense texts are contiguous with, coexisting with and conjunct to all
those elements, they somehow “contain” them. (214).
Nonsense literature and education, then, are inseparable, and this relationship is fluid.
Nonsense texts must contain aspects of education, just as education contains aspects of
nonsense, and the school is present in nonsense texts, both in theme and in discourse.
Lecercle further elaborates on the co-presence of literary text(s), social discourses, and
ideological apparatuses, or institutions, when he writes that “the first form of this copresence is the importance of the school as theme and discourse in nonsense texts . . . in
Victorian Britain the school is steeped in nonsense, and nonsense inscribes the school
within its text” (214). This relationship provides the basis for an understanding of the
Wonderland texts as a form of satire on the state of Victorian education. A reader who
understands how to use Wonderland nonsense to create sense will be better fitted to use
Victorian educational nonsense to create knowledge and understanding.
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Another vital aspect of nonsense literature, closely related to the ideas of
explanation and justification, involves the premise of conversation, or dialogue. In
nonsense literature, “dialogue is mostly agonistic, . . . not a cooperative undertaking for
mutually rewarding ends, but a verbal battle, where the speaker’s linguistic survival is
always at stake” (Lecercle 72). Such battle requires one speaker to emerge victorious and
the other to be defeated. If a speaker cannot win through use of language, speakers turn to
other methods in order to achieve victory: “speech is always threatening to give way to
brute force, for, being reduced to the function of a weapon, it may always be discarded if
or when a more powerful weapon is available” (Lecercle 72). Lecercle notes that the
Queen’s frequent declaration of “Off with her head!” stands as the perfect example of
such tendencies. This agonistic nature, therefore, exemplifies nonsense literature’s focus
on language. Unlike many other children’s adventure tales, the Wonderland texts place
Alice in verbal, rather than physical, conflict with fantastic creatures (though the
possibility of physical conflict persists). Conversation is reduced to a power struggle, and
Alice must learn to wield language in order to survive her journey through Wonderland.
She must first understand language in order to choose when to use it to create strong
arguments of her own and when to critique the arguments of her Wonderland
counterparts. Alice, once she has learned the rules of Wonderland conversation, most
often utilizes this second form when the Wonderland residents adapt nonsense as their
form of conversation, This form is central to the one primary purpose of nonsense texts,
pragmatism, for “[t]here is no nonsense that is not capable of being turned into sense.
There is no piece of language that cannot be made the pretext for a pragmatic
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manipulation which is part of an agonistic strategy” (Lecercle 98). All nonsense
possesses some link to sense; it is up to the reader to synthesize such nonsense with
familiar knowledge. Likewise, nonsense texts are neither arbitrary nor incoherent, and
“Agon is not chosen for the fun of disruption, but in order to comfort cooperation by
staging the disasters that its absence entails—which means that the strategy has a
pedagogic aim” (Lecercle 111). Thus, readers of nonsense texts are exposed to the
disastrous nature of non-cooperative conversation, in an effort to teach them the
importance of cooperation in language—the point of a conversation, such as that between
teacher and student, is not to win the conversation, not to be the dominant entity, but to
understand all aspects of such conversation. Nonsense texts intentionally incorporate
nonsense in order to force readers to consider possible sense, or responses, to this nonsense. Alice, as a dual representative (the character as a Victorian child in Wonderland
and her Oxford counterpart as a Victorian child in nineteenth century England), must
learn from Wonderland, because
the game of nonsense, and the Wonderland it calls into being are the negative
moment in the pedagogic dialectics of the acquisition by the child of good
manners, in society as in conversation. Once Alice has perceived this negative
inverted order [,] she learns to conform to the new rules and to use them for her
own purposes. (Lecercle 113)
Thus, the relationship between Alice and what she learns through the nonsense of
Wonderland closely mimics the effect of nonsense on Victorian educational institutions:
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nonsense both upholds and ruins the values of Victorian education, it both
mimics and mocks the educational institutions, it both captures and frees
the children still excluded by the system, it echoes, stages, and intervenes
upon the contradictions of language as both object and vehicle of
Victorian pedagogy. (Lecercle 220)
Education is a central theme in nonsense texts. Lewis Carroll, through his Wonderland
texts, aims to educate his readers. He does not teach his readers simply to obey, but to
explore a multitude of possible meanings, to synthesize these meanings with those put
forward by others. Therefore, his pedagogic purpose in these texts is to teach his readers,
i.e. young Victorian girls, to understand when obedience and disobedience are
appropriate, based on the evaluation of their counterparts’ (in many cases educators)
sense.
Parody and Satire in Nonsense
The work of Jean-Jacques Lecerle on nonsense literature, on the chronotope of
Victorian nonsense, is vital to developing a greater understanding of the Wonderland
texts. However, he focuses on the texts themselves, on the works of Lewis Carroll, and
does not delve deeply into the life and work of Charles Dodgson, a man deeply connected
to Victorian English literature, culture, and Victorian education. Similarly, while Lecercle
focuses heavily on the relationship between nonsense literature, Victorian England, and
the general Victorian schoolroom, he does not delve into specific instances of Victorian
education. He focuses on the generic concept of Victorian England and education rather
than on the specific laws, figures, and institutions that this thesis evaluates. Likewise, he
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does not deal much with the significant present of religious education in Victorian
England, choosing instead to consider the standard, secular (in the later nineteenth
century) Victorian classroom as his source. This thesis analyzes how Lewis
Carroll/Charles Dodgson parodies and satirizes the shifting power structures and
ideologies in Victorian England (both religious and secular), with regards to Victorian
education.
Lewis Carroll utilizes all of the aforementioned aspects of nonsense in Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. These texts are frequently
described as parodic; there are “in the two ‘Alice’ books, fifteen recognized parodies of
then currently well-known poems, five other poems not so recognized, at least so far, and
four popular nursery-rhymes” (Shaw 1). They are also often described as satirical,
especially when combined with the original illustrations of Sir John Tenniel, a cartoonist
who worked for the famously satirical magazine Punch for over fifty years. However, we
have already seen that the parody and satire (pastiche) of nonsense literature are different
from traditional forms of parody and satire, like that of Punch. Rather, Carroll utilizes the
cooperative nature of conversation, by satirizing the competitive nature of Wonderland
conversation, to propose a synthesis of parody/satire and their targets. Alice’s incorrect
recitation of religious rhymes is not, in Wonderland, religiously blasphemous; they only
offend the rules of language and logic. Carroll does not, for example, parody nursery
rhymes in order to criticize them, but to offer to young children new ways of
understanding these rhymes without condemning the original purpose as wrong. There
must be balance in nonsense; a single point of view, answer, or explanation should never
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claim to be the only one. Justification, based in logic, determines the extent of each
argument’s validity. Again, Charles Dodgson the logician appears in the works of Lewis
Carroll. Logic, rather than common sense and knowledge, is the most important aspect of
meaning to Dodgson/Carroll. In Symbolic Logic, under the Appendix heading “Addressed
to Teachers,” Carroll writes:
If I find an author saying, at the beginning of his book, “Let it be
understood that by the word ‘black’ I shall always mean ‘white’, and that
by the word ‘white’ I shall always mean ‘black’,” I meekly accept his
ruling, however injudicious I may think it. . . . I maintain that every writer
may adopt his own rule, provided of course that it is consistent with itself
and with the accepted facts of Logic. (164)
The reversal of the meaning of the words “white” and “black” is, here, an example of
nonsense. It does not abide by the rules of common sense or by traditional definition,
occurring outside of the author’s text, but within the text, it is logically sound—
containing only sense, provided it is both consistent (not random) and can be logically
justified. This, of course, applies specifically to Victorian England—twenty-first century
speakers of English would be familiar with instances of people using the term literally as
an intensifier for figurative statements, or using the plural pronoun they to refer to a
singular, gender-neutral antecedent, without the speakers or writers having prefaced these
usages.
The large number of parodies in the Wonderland texts reflects a significant
criticism of Victorian education: rote learning. Alice repeatedly resorts to recitation of
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her school lessons when confronted with the unexpected experiences of Wonderland, but
she has not learned the appropriate application of these lessons. She instead acts as a
child who has been possessed by this knowledge but who is not in control of it. Carroll
criticizes Victorian educators who assume memorization of a topic denotes
understanding. Alice, on the other hand, gains understanding through her experiences and
through questioning her educators, often in response to the flawed educational processes
of the Wonderland creatures. Nonsense, therefore,
is a constant effort towards mastery, towards blocking the emergence of
the radically unmeant, the true or radical nonsense of possession or
delirium. Alice’s possession is a mild, even if disquieting, case—it is
limited to recitation. The repetition of the failure to recite the right words
is nothing other than the compulsive re-staging of the primitive scene of
language, where mastery over language is mythically acquired—the
compulsiveness of the re-staging being due to repeated, inevitable failure.
(Lecercle 134)
Lecercle’s use of the word “possession” here is itself a loaded term. He associates school
lessons with demonic possession, creating a link between secular classroom education
and religious education. This link also connects religious education, which relies heavily
on rote recitation, with demonic possession, causing readers to question the value of such
learning. Because of this questionable value of her previous lessons, Alice must never
assume that anything she has previously been taught in Victorian England, experienced in
Wonderland, or told by the Wonderland residents is correct; rather, she must apply her
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Victorian lessons to her experiences, and come to a synthesis of ideas, where all aspects
of her knowledge can be logically accounted for. This stands true even when her new
knowledge appears contradictory; Lecercle notes that Lewis Carroll once claimed that “if
he had a choice between a watch that was always a minute fast and another that did not
work at all, he would plump for the latter, since it gave the right time twice a day,
whereas the former never did” (qtd. in Lecercle 166-67). True, the watch that never
worked tells the exact time more often than one that is not properly calibrated; however,
the owner of the working watch should understand it to be fast and adapt. Both of these
situations, while in opposition, are correct; one simply has to understand when to use
each situation, based on their explanation. In a logic classroom, the watch that is perfectly
precise twice a day is the superior option, but in everyday practice the one that performs
the intended action of a watch, albeit slightly misadjusted, is by far the more useful. This
watch is a perfect example of Carroll’s use of nonsense to illustrate his strategy of
synthesis. Carroll frequently presents, in his writing, situations where a seemingly
nonsensical statement or response carries certain aspects of sense; however, these
situations are not accurate in every situation. It is up to his readers to determine when and
how to utilize these aspects of (non)sense.
Because his original audience was the three young Liddell sisters, Lewis Carroll
tailored his parody around the type of education that these young Victorian girls would
have experienced. Lecercle claims that “the filiation which goes from nursery rhymes to
school rhymes to literary nonsense is fairly straightforward. First there were nursery
rhymes, then there was Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” (185). Victorian nonsense
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owes its origins to nursery rhymes, limericks, fairy tales, and school rhymes, the latter
being the most closely related. As such, there is a close relationship between nonsense,
Victorian religious education (in the form of nursery rhymes), and classroom/schoolyard
education (both rote learning rhymes and schoolyard rhymes). This thesis analyzes how
Lewis Carroll’s Wonderland texts, as one of the greatest examples of Victorian nonsense,
parodies and satirizes (mostly in the form of pastiche, of synthesis) Victorian religious
and secular classroom forms of education.
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CHAPTER III
EDUCATION IN THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL

As we have seen from the work of Jean-Jacques Lecercle, education and nonsense
literature are interconnected. Carrollian scholarship supports this concept: a significant
portion of Carrollian criticism deals with various aspects of education. The work of
Donald Rackin explores how, in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, the characters and
experiences of Wonderland educate Alice and force her to recreate her identity. Michael
Mendelson expands on this idea, using Aristotle’s concept of practical wisdom to
separate Alice’s Wonderland education into various types of knowledge. He utilizes
Aristotle’s explanations in order to teach Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland to his own
students. Mendelson’s use of the Wonderland texts as educational tools strongly
resembles the original pedagogic purposes of these texts. After all, Charles Dodgson was
a lecturer in mathematics at Christ Church College, Oxford and author of mathematics
textbooks. As a logician at Oxford, Carroll was familiar with, either by reading or by
knowing personally, the main linguists of his time: John Horne Tooke, Richard Chevenix
Trench, and Max Müller (Lecercle 196). However, his background was in mathematical
logic and not linguistics, but he brilliantly blends the two fields in Euclid and His Modern
Rivals, a mathematical defense or argument in support of his geometric pedagogy written
in dramatic form. Although Lecercle does not specifically refer to Euclid and His Modern
Rivals, and only three times to Sylvie and Bruno, as he focuses more on the linguistic
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aspect of the relationship rather than the logical side, he does explain how Carroll links
the rules of Victorian linguistics to those of logical support in much of his work:
There is a sense in which nonsense is a metanarrative genre, an intuitive,
proto-reflexive view of fiction. In turn, this capacity for intuition is due to
the genre’s intimate relation to logic. The relation is not only subjective
(in the case of Lewis Carroll), but also objective. The negative prefix
indicates a relation of Freudian negation to the rules of sensible discourse,
that which provides the bounds of linguistic sense, logic. And the wild
imagination of nonsense is bound to exploit, and thereby make manifest,
the constraints imposed on propositions by categories and logical form.
(199)
Nonsense literature, like the Wonderland texts, provides an avenue for education that
relies on the logical forms of justification and support. Carroll utilizes these forms to
present a strategy of compromise, by which multiple logically supported responses can be
correct at the same time, without proving other responses incorrect, though he does
sometimes express a preference for a particular response. In the Preface to Sylvie and
Bruno Concluded,6 Carroll reveals that
critics have objected to certain innovations in spelling, such as “ca’n’t,”
“wo’n’t,” “traveler.” In reply, I can only plead my firm conviction that the
popular usage is wrong. As to “ca’n’t,” it will not be disputed that, in all

6

Sylvie and Bruno Concluded was a sequel to Sylvie and Bruno and the final novel published by Lewis
Carroll. Like Carroll’s earlier work, much of the combined text takes place in a fantasy setting, but unlike
the Wonderland texts, a significant portion of this work is set in Victorian England, allowing for a more
direct satire of Victorian England and English culture.
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other words ending in “n’t,” these letters are an abbreviation of “not”; and
it is surely absurd to suppose that, in this solitary instance, “not” is
represented by “’t”! In fact, “can’t” is the proper abbreviation for “can it,”
just as “is’t” is for “is it.” Again, in “wo’n’t,” the first apostrophe is
needed, because the word “would” is here abridged into “wo”: but I hold
it proper to spell “don’t” with only one apostrophe, because the word “do”
is here complete. (509-10)
While Carroll claims that the existing rule is wrong, he means that it does not adhere to
proper rules that would be taught to a student in a grammar lesson, not that he believes it
to be incorrect in the mathematical sense (a complete negation of the rule; mathematical
equations are either entirely correct or entirely incorrect). The English language is full of
exceptions to the rules of proper grammar, mechanics, and orthography, and Carroll
believes that these exceptions often cause confusion. While he insists on creating his own
rules for contractions, he provides an explanation for them in the preface to his text so
that readers are not confused when they encounter these situations. This shows Carroll’s
adherence to logic rather than tradition, to simplicity rather than dogma. It also shows his
emphasis on justification rather than memorization: if he is able justify his alternate
usage, why shouldn’t he make these modifications? Isn’t a simpler, standard form of
grammar a better choice than a complicated, irregular way, left over from the evolution of
English from several other languages? Carroll here has provided an additional option,
allowing a choice on the part of users of the English language, who may, perhaps, choose
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a compromise between the two (later editions of Carroll’s work have removed the extra
apostrophes).
In this chapter, I provide evidence of Lewis Carroll’s strategy of synthesis; in
education this synthesis manifests as a preference for justification and explanation over
memorization and rote learning. This often leads to his work being described as
nonsense, though the term does not denote a simple lack of sense (as per Lecercle’s
definitions). This nonsense allows for multiple conflicting but correct answers, provided
they are justified, which allows for his students/readers (for Carroll frequently educates
as he entertains) to attain practical wisdom, what Aristotle referred to as phronesis. All of
these methods of synthesis and compromise act to satirize traditional Victorian modes of
education, which maintain their form(s) as the superior, and therefore only, method for
education.
Lewis Carroll long favored justification and explanation to simple rote learning
and memorization as the primary method of child education. He includes explanations of
much of his work within the prefaces of later editions of his texts. In the preface to the
1896 edition of Through the Looking-Glass, Carroll reveals his strategies of justification
and of compromise:
As the chess-problem, given on the previous page, has puzzled some of
my readers, it may be well to explain that it is correctly worked out, so far
as the moves are concerned. The alternation of Red and White is perhaps
not so strictly observed as it might be, and the “castling” of the three
Queens is merely a way of saying that they entered the palace; but the
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“check” of the White Knight at move 6, the capture of the Red Knight at
move 7, and the final “checkmate” of the Red King, will be found, by any
one who will take the trouble to set the pieces and play the moves as
directed, to be strictly in accordance with the laws of the game. (138)
Carroll here presents two key compromises, each logically sound. First, while a young
child may be familiar with the rules of chess, he or she may also be expected to
occasionally make mistakes, or at least be unaware of the mistakes of others during a
chess match. Second, though he claims “[t]he alternation of Red and White is perhaps
not so strictly observed,” he later claims the moves themselves “to be strictly in
accordance with the laws of the game” (138). While his approach to chess does not
follow the rigid rules of the game, Carroll arrives at the same conclusion that a chess
match, played according to the rules of the game, would have. His justification of these
steps to reach his conclusion proves his claim to be viable. Carroll neither criticizes the
rules of chess nor advocates ignoring the rules of the game, but instead shows how he
(and by extension his readers) can adapt previously held rules to fit new situations. This
parody of chess reflects Carroll’s criticism of the rigidity of Victorian education laws and
of forms of rote learning that Victorian schoolchildren were exposed to.
A prime example of Carroll’s preference for justification manifests itself in his
work in the form of one of the most iconic characters of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland: the Hatter. The Hatter asks Alice “[w]hy is a raven like a writing-desk?”
(75). Alice responds with “I believe I can guess that,” believing that she will finally have
some fun (75). This response indicates Alice does not understand that education and
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entertainment are not mutually exclusive. She believes that, like many religious and
formal educational institutions, a teacher-student relationship cannot involve
entertainment, so this riddle provides her with an escape from the previous didacticism of
the Tea-Party guests into the realm of childish fun. The Hatter’s response, “[d]o you
mean that you think you can find out the answer to it,” turns the riddle from a simple
question and answer situation into a site of education for Alice (75). If Alice simply
guesses why a raven is like a writing desk, she does not truly understand how to answer
the question. If she happens to guess correctly, but does not understand why her response
is correct, she is lucky, not knowledgeable. Similarly, if Alice simply recites facts
without knowing how to properly use those facts (as she frequently resorts to during the
first part of her Wonderland journey), she has not learned anything useful. After a brief
back-and-forth between Alice and the tea-party guests, the Hatter asks if Alice has
“guessed the riddle yet?” (78). Here, the Hatter has chosen to repeat Alice’s use of the
word “guessed” rather than asking if Alice has arrived at an answer to the riddle. In
response, Alice gives up without even attempting an answer, as she does not know how
to answer correctly. Both the Hatter and March Hare respond that they are also unable to
answer the riddle, implying that the riddle itself has no answer. Had she attempted to find
the solution to this verbal problem, Alice most likely would have received more
“nonsense” from the Wonderland residents, which, through dialogue, would emphasize
justification of her response (asking Alice to explain her statements) rather than the
response itself (her response as either correct or incorrect). Alice claims that attempting
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to solve a riddle with no answer is a waste of time, not realizing that even if she does not
arrive at a solution, her attempt to discover meaning would result in knowledge.
The term “nonsense” is extremely important in situations such as the Hatter’s
riddle: like many forms of religious education, Alice believes that something must have
either a single, correct answer or no answer at all. She does not understand the
importance of justification or the fact that a single question may result in multiple
solutions. Jean-Jacques Lecercle believes that the term nonsense provides for this, that
nonsense “is to be taken not so much as the trace of a cognitive judgment, (‘I assert that
there is no sense in this text’) but rather as an elliptic exclamative, calling for dialogic
response” (180). The fact that there is no single, correct answer to the Hatter’s riddle that
negates all other answers from being correct does not discount the possibility of a
response. The answer itself is not as important as the justification, provided the person
who gives the answer is able to support said answer with evidence, logic, and reasoning
rather than simply by guessing or through recitation. This use of evidence to support an
answer is central to Lewis Carroll’s logic, and by extension, his satire of rote
memorization.
Although his riddle does not have an answer within the text, and he makes no
effort to educate Alice on possible responses, the Hatter does provide other forms of
education to Alice. When Alice claims that meaning what she says is the same as saying
what she means, the Hatter responds that these are “[n]ot the same thing a bit! Why, you
might just as well say that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see!’” (76).
Here, the Hatter has correctly identified a logical flaw in Alice’s speech. Because the
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Hatter provides Alice with knowledge through nonsense, he demonstrates Lewis
Carroll’s main purpose in satirizing Victorian education. Carroll does not claim that the
dominant form of education, learning by rote, is completely wrong; rather, he believes
that students need to evaluate every situation in order to understand what they experience
and learn, and then be able to justify their actions or responses. After all, rote
memorization is useless if students are unable to apply this knowledge.7
Carroll himself felt a need to understand reasoning, even if he didn’t comprehend
the final answer. Stuart Dodgson Collingwood, Lewis Carroll’s nephew and biographer,
tells a story from Carroll’s youth that emphasizes this focus on justification:
One day, when Charles was a very small boy, he came up to his father and
showed him a book of logarithms, with the request “Please explain.” Mr.
Dodgson told him that he was much too young to understand anything
about such a difficult subject. The child listened to what his father said,
and appeared to think it irrelevant, for he still insisted, “But, please,
explain!” (Collingwood 12-13).
Carroll’s fascination with mathematics remained throughout his life; he taught
mathematics at Christ Church College, Oxford for twenty-six years. Even while teaching
mathematics and logic, he still favored explanation over memorization.
Euclid and His Modern Rivals,8 a mathematical argument for Euclid published
under Carroll’s true name, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, exemplifies this preference for

7

For an in-depth analysis of the failure of rote memorization in Victorian schools, see Chapter V of this
thesis.
8
Published in 1879, as a satire on educational reform for the sake of reform, while Dodgson was a lecturer
in mathematics at Christ Church College, Oxford.
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explanation. Dodgson presents his book in a four-act dramatic form; Carroll here blends
the scientific, either/or nature of mathematics with the creative, fluid nature of drama. He
prefaces his book by stating:
In one respect this book is an experiment, and may chance to prove a
failure: I mean that I have not thought it necessary to maintain throughout
the gravity of style which scientific writers usually affect, and which has
somehow come to be regarded as an “inseparable accident” of scientific
teaching. I never could quite see the reasonableness of this immemorial
law: subjects there are, no doubt, which are in their essence too serious to
admit to any lightness of treatment—but I cannot recognize Geometry as
one of them. Nevertheless it will, I trust, be found that I have permitted
myself a glimpse of the comic side of things only at fitting seasons, when
the tired reader might well crave a moment’s breathing-space, and not on
any occasion where it could endanger the continuity of a line of
argument.9 (x)
By abandoning the scientific language of mathematics in this textbook, Dodgson nearly
explicitly states the disapproval of rote learning that he so frequently satirizes in his
writings under the penname Lewis Carroll. Rather than maintain a rigid system of
question and answer, Dodgson’s textbook provides dialogue that justifies the step-by-step
process through which his characters arrive at answers to logic problems. He
accomplishes this process by placing his characters in dialogue with each other, a

9

This quotation has had a lasting impact on the English world: in 2000, the web-based encyclopedia
Wikipedia utilized this quotation in its homepage image.
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situation calling to memory Alice’s thought, on the first page of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, of “what is the use of a book . . . without pictures or conversations?” (17).
Such conversations also emphasize Carroll’s preference for dialogue in education, rather
than a simple system of rote memorization based solely on question and answer. Carroll
also provided examples of situations where the material taught via rote learning can be
incorrect. In Act III, Scene, I of Euclid and His Modern Rivals, the character Minos
criticizes Herr Niemand regarding a problem from a standardized mathematics textbook,
E. M. Reynolds’ Modern Methods in Elementary Geometry:
In Th. I (p. 3), I read “the angles CDA, CDB are together equal to two
right angles. For they fill exactly the same space.” Do you mean finite or
infinite space? If “finite,” we increase the angle by lengthening its sides: if
“infinite,” the idea is unsuited for elementary teaching. You had better
abandon the idea of an angle “filling space,” which is no improvement on
Euclid’s method. (175)
While the information from the aforementioned mathematics problem is correct in many
cases, Dodgson does not feel that the language is sufficiently precise. Though his
emphasis is on precision of terms (an important issue in mathematics), rote memorization
of imprecise terms leads to a flawed understanding of the subject. The problem does not
explain to elementary students of mathematics the appropriate use of said problem—that
the term “space” applies, in this usage, to only geometry. Dodgson’s critique of
mathematics textbooks, then, explains both the answers to problems and when the use of
mathematics for said problems is appropriate—or when to use mathematical terms and
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when to avoid using them. This section of Euclid and his Modern Rivals is also thick
with satire. Herr Niemand literally translates from German to English as Mr. Nobody,
and Dodgson consistently shows Niemand’s arguments to be unsupported and, as a result,
flawed. Dodgson here uses Herr Niemand to satirize Victorian educational figures who
demand educational change for the sake of change and not for the benefit of students
(Victorian nonsense literature arose from the vast changes to education during the middle
part of the nineteenth century). He also uses this textbook to satirize Victorian figures
who implemented sudden changes without preparing students for the transitions.
Dodgson shows, in this textbook, that there is nothing wrong with continuing to teach
Euclid to students of mathematics, while at the same time granting that some of the newer
styles of mathematics can be beneficial to students. Act 3 also begins with the phrase
“[t]hough this be madness, yet there’s method in‘t” (175). This line, from Hamlet, is
Polonius’ comment on Hamlet’s feigned madness. However, in the preceding line from
this Shakespeare play, Hamlet refers to the author of a book he is reading as a “satirical
rogue”; Dodgson’s choice to include this reference at the beginning of his third act
implies, to a well-read audience, that he considers himself a satirical rogue of an author
and educator (2.2.197).
Carroll provides a similar example of his preference for justification and support
in one of his “Puzzles from Wonderland.” Carroll asks:
A stick I found that weighed two pound:
I sawed it up one day
In pieces eight of equal weight!
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How much did each piece weigh?
(Everybody says “a quarter of a pound,” which is wrong.). (819)
Many readers, would consider this puzzle to be nonsense in the traditional sense, as the
final line negates the expected response. Lecercle, had he included it in his analysis,
would likely have described this rhyme as literary nonsense, as the final line calls for a
dialogic response, for both an explanation of why the common answer is incorrect and for
Carroll’s (expected) answer. Had this been a story problem in a mathematics lesson, a
quarter of a pound would have been the proper answer; the instructor would assume that
this poem presents the equation two divided by eight. However, Carroll critiques this
simple, binary form of questioning in his answer poem:
In Shylock’s bargain for flesh was found
No mention of the blood that flowed around:
So when the stick was sawed in eight,
The sawdust lost diminished from the weight. (821)
The common response, upon hearing the first poem, would be to find the claim that two
divided by eight is not one quarter to be nonsense. Carroll’s answer provides an example
of his strategy of compromise and of his use of metasense, or of multiple answers to a
single question. He again references Shakespeare, this time The Merchant of Venice,
combining the literary aspects of drama with the scientific aspects of mathematics.
Carroll’s riddle can be correctly answered in many ways, depending on how one explains
the calculation of sawdust (if one can even calculate this number without more
information; say, the specific type of wood, the measurements of the sawblade, or the
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force the sawyer applies to the saw). This use of metasense does not mean that Carroll
believes logic and wordplay to be superior to mathematics; rather, he believes that a child
who can justify his or her responses is a far more knowledgeable child than one who can
simply recite mathematics tables. Put another way, the mathematical equation of two
divided by eight equals one quarter would be correct for a student of mathematics, but
Carroll’s riddle would be correct for a student of carpentry, where the length of the final
pieces, and thus the final product, are the only important result. In Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, the Caterpillar provides a similar situation:
“One side will make you grow taller, and the other side will make you
grow shorter.”
“One side of what? The other side of what?” thought Alice to herself.
“Of the mushroom,” said the Caterpillar, just as if she had asked it aloud;
and in another moment it was out of sight. Alice remained looking
thoughtfully at the mushroom for a minute, trying to make out which were
the two sides of it; and, as it was perfectly round, she found this a very
difficult question. (59)
A circle is a paradoxical figure, having opposite sides but at the same time no corners to
mark their boundaries. A student, asked to identify two sides of a circle, would have no
difficulty in identifying opposite positions on said circle, but how would they know to
relate this to some invisible separation created by their instructor? In this situation, any
two opposing positions on a circle can be identified as opposite sides; all that is required
is the justification for the (in most cases) ambiguous decision to select those points.
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Carroll’s strategy for justification and compromise is not limited to scientific or
mathematical education. Although he held tremendous respect for the works of
Shakespeare, Carroll believed that they could be improved in order to better educate
Victorian children. In his introduction to Sylvie and Bruno,10 Carroll writes that he would
like to compile “a collection of passages, both prose and verse, from books other than the
Bible” (281). These passages would be read and reflected on by children, to improve their
minds. Some Victorian educators, particularly those with religious connections, would
disagree with a collection of such popular, secular, “un-inspired literature” as
Shakespeare being used to educate young children (especially with some Victorian
churches condemning the popular theatre), but Carroll counters this disagreement with
his belief that “if Shakespeare was not inspired, one may well doubt if any man ever was”
(281). Because of his strong belief in compromise, Carroll champions for variety of
literature (mathematics, drama, poetry, sciences, etc.) in education, rather than for the
singular genre of education (that which was approved by the governing religious body)
that was prevalent in Victorian religious educational institutions. This, in turn, leads to
another book that Carroll would like to see written: a version of Shakespeare designed for
young girls. In such a book, material unsuitable for young Victorian girls, from around 10
to 17, should be removed. By unsuitable material, Carroll means not just material he
deems inappropriate to these girls, but “also all that seems too difficult, or not likely to
interest young readers. The resulting book might be slightly fragmentary: but it would be
a real treasure to all British maidens who have any taste for poetry” (283). This statement
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Although Lecercle briefly addresses Sylvie and Bruno in his work, his focus remains on linguistic aspects
of the text rather than on its content.
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explains why so much of his work appears fragmentary; he has removed anything he does
not feel is essential. Here Carroll’s sense of compromise affects not religious material,
but artistic material. A lover of Shakespeare may be just as offended by Carroll’s
significant censorship of the Bard as a clergyman would by his censorship of the Bible.11
However, Carroll is not concerned with the artist or the clergyman; instead, he is
concerned with the student. In a letter to the actress Ellen Terry, concerning the subject of
The Merchant of Venice, Carroll writes:
I want to see the clause omitted (in the sentence on Shylock)—“That, for
this favour, / He presently become a Christian;” It is a sentiment that is
entirely horrible and revolting to the feelings of all who believe in the
Gospel of Love. Why should our ears be shocked by such words merely
because they are Shakespeare’s? . . . To all Christians now (except perhaps
extreme Calvinists) the idea of forcing a man to abjure his religion,
whatever that religion may be, is (as I have said) simply horrible. I have
spoken of it as a needless outrage on religious feeling: but surely, being
so, it is a great artistic mistake. (Collingwood 182-83)
As a man, Carroll firmly believes that anything should be an open target for censorship or
change, that everything can be improved upon, provided said change is in the best interest
of those involved (in Carroll’s case, usually young girls). He is careful to explain and
justify his claims, showing how these changes would benefit young students. These
explanations also illustrate Carroll’s emphasis on education in all aspects of his thought.
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For more information on Carroll’s censorship of the Bible, see chapter V of this thesis.
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Carroll’s criticism of traditional rote learning in favor of a form of practical
wisdom exemplifies his satire of the Victorian education system: the vast majority of
Victorian education utilized extensive rote learning strategies with no explanation of how
a student should properly apply what they have learned to their lives outside of the
classroom. Carroll’s conclusions are not new; the Greek philosopher Cicero once
commented “how little difference there is between the learned and the ignorant in
judging” (qtd. in Thiele 104). Wonderland is full of characters who attempt to judge both
Alice and other Wonderland residents. The King who, as a literal judge, presides over the
trial must be constantly reminded of the rules of law by the White Rabbit, such as when
he asks the jury to “[c]onsider your verdict” before the trial has even begun (116). The
Duchess acts as judge in a different capacity, telling Alice that “[e]verything’s got a
moral, if only you can find it” (96). The Duchess then carries on a conversation with
Alice, misunderstanding most of what is said but making moral judgments on the
statements nonetheless.12

For a deeper analysis of classroom education and the Duchess’ moralizing, see Chapters IV and V of this
thesis.
12
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Wisdom in Wonderland
The lyrical parodies within the Wonderland texts also help to provide justification
for Alice’s Wonderland knowledge. Alice is consistently put in situations where she must
alter both her actions and her understanding. Her responses to these situations echo the
reactions of child readers of these Wonderland texts:
Alice’s assumptions about the world include fictive conventions inherited
from children’s stories as well as the experiences accumulated through
first-hand encounters of daily life. As a result, a talking rabbit is routine
because recognizable, while the novelty of a rabbit with a waistcoat and a
watch calls up an entirely different response. (Mendelson 290)
This connection between children’s stories and logic is vitally important to Victorian
education, due to the emphasis placed on education through conduct books, nursery
rhymes, and other widely-known children’s literature used by Victorian educators. By
parodying commonly known stories, poems, and songs, and including explanation and
justification for the Wonderland equivalents, Carroll provides his readers with the
opportunity to question the value of the originals.13
Michael Mendelson has completed a considerable amount of scholarship
regarding Alice’s education in the Wonderland texts. He applies Aristotle’s concept of
phronesis to Carroll’s emphasis on justification rather than on memorization. By
connecting Alice’s Wonderland education with Aristotle’s phronesis, or practical
wisdom, and separating this form of knowing from scientific, artistic, theoretical, and

For detailed explanations of Carroll’s lyrical parodies in the Wonderland texts, Chapters IV and V of this
thesis.
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intuitive knowledge, Mendelson argues that Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland requires
Alice to abandon her early understanding of knowledge, based on her school lessons, in
favor of common sense (40). This common sense appears to contradict Lecercle’s use of
nonsense, but the two are closely related: they focus on methods of learning rather than
on the material of lessons. Mendelson relies on Aristotle’s book 6 of Nichomachean
Ethics, where Aristotle describes phronesis as a mixture of interpretation and creativity in
order to adapt one’s actions to meet various situations. In Aristotle’s Ethics, David
Bostock expands on Aristotle’s definition, contrasting phronesis with Aristotle’s other
form of wisdom, sophia. While sophia is traditionally translated as “wisdom,” Bostock
prefers the term “theoretical wisdom,” and while phronesis is traditionally translated as
“practical wisdom,” Bostock prefers the terms “being thoughtful” or “being sensible”
(77). Alice’s actions when she first arrives in Wonderland provide the perfect example of
the failure of Victorian rote education. Alice struggles with her own identity, asking
herself “[w]ho in the world am I?” (28). She attempts to answer this question first by
reciting her multiplication tables, then by reciting her Geography lessons, and finally by
reciting the poem “How doth the little—,” but these recitations fail to improve her
situation. Alice possesses the theoretical wisdom taught to her through Victorian
educational systems and institutions, but she has never been taught the sensibility to
properly utilize her theoretical wisdom and apply it to her life outside the classroom. She
makes these mistakes because, as Donald Rackin claims, “Alice’s assumptions are
typically no more than her elders’ operating premises, which she maintains with a
doctrinaire passion that is almost a caricature of immature credulity” (394). Alice has
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been taught that everything told to her by Victorian instructors is fact, and she has never
questioned this “truth.” However, when she realizes that her Wonderland educators
frequently make mistakes in their justification, or are simply unable or unwilling to
justify their responses, Alice begins to abandon traditional Victorian educational
processes, develop practical wisdom, and synthesize the two, altering her behavior to suit
various situations.
Though he contrasts practical wisdom with other forms of knowing, Mendelson
does not claim that practical wisdom is superior. Rather, he advocates the belief that an
individual, here represented by Alice, should recognize when each form of knowledge or
knowing is appropriate. This recognition is the same concept as Carroll’s strategy of
synthesis. As Leslie Paul Thiele writes, “[p]ractical judgment finds in literature a
workshop where its skills and sensibilities may be finely honed” (238). Readers of the
Wonderland texts, then, learn practical wisdom alongside Alice, and Lewis Carroll is
successful in presenting an alternative to the standard, rote form of learning that
dominated Victorian education. Alice does not completely abandon her school lessons;
she learns when she should apply school lessons to life and when she should adopt a
different approach to understanding the world around her. In this sense, Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland acts as a form of conduct book, educating its readers on
appropriate forms of knowing.
Thiele defines practical wisdom as “an aptitude for assessing, evaluating, and
choosing in the absence of certainties or principles that dictate or generate right answers.
Judges cannot rely on algorithms. Their efforts always exceed adherence to rules and are
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not tightly tethered to law” (5). However, the Wonderland residents are notoriously
lacking in their ability to assess and evaluate any belief other than their own. Many
Wonderland characters adopt the role of judge when they meet Alice, but, because they
cannot understand her Victorian system of knowledge, they end up as examples of flawed
judges. The most famous of these is, of course, the Queen of Hearts, who constantly
judges and sentences various other characters to death by decapitation (although the King
explains that these sentences are never carried out). Additionally, although there is a jury
in the courtroom scene in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, it is the Queen who
maintains authority over these jurors, at least until Alice effectively ends the trial by
escaping Wonderland. Alice is finally able to utilize the practical wisdom that she has
learned through her Wonderland encounters to take control of the situation, correct her
Wonderland companions, and return to Victorian England. Alice learns that, as Thiele
writes, “[g]ood judgment is not so much gained in the classroom as in the school of hard
knocks” (8). Her experiences in Wonderland, based on faulty education, not her Victorian
school lessons, which are factually correct, have taught her how to respond appropriately
to new and unexpected situations that many readers have described as nonsense. For
example, in Chapter VIII of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, when she is forced to
play a game of croquet with a live flamingo for her mallet and a live hedgehog for her
ball, Alice is at first mystified. She quickly learns, however, that the goal of this croquet
match is not to win, as would be the case in Victorian England. Victorian croquet
followed very strict rules of play, but Wonderland croquet doesn’t “seem to have any
rules in particular: at least, if there are, nobody attends to them” (92). She concludes that
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the true purpose of the croquet game is to flatter the Queen; the setting of a croquet match
is irrelevant. While the character of Alice has learned these lessons from her experiences,
readers must also remember that the original audience, the three Liddell sisters, learned
these lessons directly from Charles Dodgson.
The fact that both Wonderland texts are written from Alice’s perspective is
extremely important to the concept of practical wisdom. Thiele writes that “[t]he
articulation of a judgment typically signals its conscious birth” (71). Readers, therefore,
get to experience Alice’s acquisition of practical wisdom as the character does, and this
experience serves to educate young readers of the Wonderland texts. After all, Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland was originally an oral tales told to the three Liddell sisters. At
the same time, however, the reader is occasionally made aware of the authorial presence
of Lewis Carroll. For example, in the first chapter of Through the Looking-Glass, Carroll
breaks from his description of Alice and her kitten to address the reader directly: “I wish I
could tell you half the things Alice used to say, beginning with her favourite phrase ‘Let’s
pretend’” (145). These breaks remind readers that Alice is a fictional character, and that
the book is meant not to be read by a lone individual, but by a speaker (adult) to a listener
(child). These multiple viewpoints contrast the Wonderland characters, who cannot see
things from Alice’s point of view, with the reader, who sees Alice’s, Carroll’s, and a
third-person viewpoint of the story. As such, readers are privy to Alice’s evolution, from
the one-sided Victorian (and its opposite, Wonderland) style of thought to her
understanding of the multiplicity of knowledge that lies between the two poles.
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Readers are not only privy to the thoughts of the author and narrator but to Alice’s
thoughts as well. Throughout the texts, Alice thinks out loud, voicing many of her
thought processes both to the Wonderland residents and to readers of the text. This adds
an additional element to a reader’s understanding of the Victorian texts: Thiele writes that
“[n]ot all that is thought, felt, or intuited finds a voice; and what gets selected for
articulation or relegated to silence can significantly alter the judgments we develop” (73).
Thus, a reader experiences what Alice says and thinks as well as what she may not be
aware of, presented either through other Wonderland characters or through the narration
or description by Carroll himself. Unlike the standard relationship between narrative and
dialogue, where there is a binary relationship between the author and character(s), the
Wonderland texts include narrative breaks which create a three-part relationship: author,
character(s), and reader(s). Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland strays from most
author/reader relationships in that the general relationship between Lewis Carroll and his
reader is different than the original relationship between Charles Dodgson and the Liddell
sisters. As such, readers may infer that Carroll has chosen to eliminate some explanation
he gave in response to the Liddell sisters, while including others that a reader may not be
familiar with, such as explanations and intuitions that explain Alice’s personality. While
the relationship between author and character is usually one-way (the author can affect a
character but a character cannot affect the author), the relationship between author
(Carroll), characters (Alice), and readers (both the Liddell sisters, who were present to
ask questions and affect the story, both in content and in presentation, and Victorian
readers, who frequently corresponded with Carroll regarding his work) is much more
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fluid. Because of this extended relationship, there are details within Carroll’s stories that,
to understand, require a very particular point of reference; these references usually appear
in the form of parody, pastiche, or satire. In the introduction to one of his later stories,
Sylvie and Bruno, Carroll describes this fragmentary style of writing: “thus it came to
pass that I found myself at last in possession of a huge unwieldy mass of litterature—if
the reader will kindly excuse the spelling—which only needed stringing together, upon
the thread of a consecutive story” (278). Carroll’s works are collections of ideas, events,
characters, and other bits of Victorian culture, fit together in a larger text. These
references necessitate an intimate understanding of Carroll, his specific audiences, and of
Victorian and Oxfordian culture. There is, then, an abundance of parody, pastiche, satire,
and reference, of both Christ Church and Oxford and of Victorian England as a whole in
the works of Lewis Carroll. Likewise, matters traditionally found serious, such as religion
and law, are mixed with the comic, forming a compromise between seriousness and
comedy without declaring one superior to the other.
Because of Carroll’s style of fiction writing, texts such as Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass provide readers with the opportunity to mix
entertainment with education. In fact, this mixture led to the creation of the portmanteauword (itself a term created by Lewis Carroll) edutainment. Although the overt purpose for
texts such as these is to entertain, they act covertly to educate young readers. The
opposite is often not the case: many school textbooks are noticeably lacking in
entertainment. Lewis Carroll was certainly not the first to do this, as children’s literature
has been used to both entertain and instruct for as long as it has existed, but during the
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Victorian era, fiction writers were beginning to embrace children’s texts as a vehicle
through which the rote learning of religious and secular educational institutions could be
countered. In the preface to her 1839 children’s novel Holiday House, Scottish author
Catherine Sinclair writes:
In this age of wonderful mechanical inventions, the very mind of youth
seems in danger of becoming a machine; and while every effort is used to
stuff the memory, like a cricket-ball, with well-known facts and readymade opinions, no room is left for the vigour of natural feeling, the glow
of natural genius, and the ardour of natural enthusiasm. It was a remark of
Sir Walter Scott’s many years ago, to the author herself, that in the rising
generation there would be no poets, wits, or orators, because all play of
imagination is carefully discouraged, and books written for young people
are generally a mere dry record of facts, unenlivened by any appeal to the
heart, or any excitement of the fancy. The catalogue of a child’s library
would contain Conversations on Natural Philosophy,—on Chemistry,—
on Botany,—on Arts and Sciences,—Chronological Records of History,—
and travels as dry as a road-book; but nothing in the habits of ways of
thinking, natural and suitable to the taste of children. (vi-vii)14
This quotation reveals a problem that authors like Carroll attempt to address: not to
condemn scientific, religious, and rote learning, but to offer an alternative or supplement,
a middle ground where children can be entertained as they are educated. Because students
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For a more in-depth analysis of the conflict between fiction and fact in Victorian writing, see Ronald
Reichertz’ The Making of the Alice Books: Lewis Carroll’s Uses of Earlier Children’s Literature.
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often feel more engaged with familiar material, this middle ground often appears through
the combination of various situations already familiar to these students, such as nursery
rhymes or famous characters (Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass stands as a
perfect example).
Lewis Carroll’s strategy of synthesis thus reconciles the rigid, scientific, rote
memorization of standard Victorian educational institutions with the creative,
entertaining, evidence-based argumentation present in works such as the Wonderland
texts and Euclid and His Modern Rivals. By allowing for, and in many cases insisting
upon, a multiplicity of possible answers to a single question, Carroll forces readers of his
texts to understand the meaning of their lessons, rather than to simply repeat what they
are told. Carroll also synthesizes the dull, rigid language of science with the imaginative
content of literature. This compromise helps readers and students understand the practical
application of their lessons, resulting in practical wisdom that truly helps them learn.
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CHAPTER IV
LEWIS CARROLL AND SATIRE OF VICTORIAN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In “Theory of Myths” from Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye writes that “[i]n
the warfare of science against superstition, the satirists have done famously. . . . Similarly
with religion” (231). Lewis Carroll brilliantly blends the superstitions of Victorian
propriety and Victorian religion in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the
Looking-Glass. Frye further writes:
satire shows literature assuming a special function of analysis, of breaking
up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious errors, crank
theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things
that impede the free movement (not necessarily, of course, the progress) of
society. (233)
Frye’s “fossilized beliefs” and “pedantic dogmatisms” are apt descriptions of Victorian
religious education, which had undergone very little change during the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. His use of the term “movement” rather than “progress” is also
appropriate to the satire of Lewis Carroll; Carroll offers a supplementary alternative to
solely religious education rather than a direct condemnation of the dominant educational
styles of Victorian England.
Lewis Carroll does not, in his writings, directly criticize religion itself. After all,
Lewis Carroll was the penname of the Reverend Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, who was
also the son of an archdeacon. His status as a Student of Christ Church College came
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with only two requirements: that he should “remain unmarried, and should proceed to
Holy Orders” (Collingwood 52). The thought of taking Holy Orders greatly distressed
Dodgson, for two main reasons. First, he believed that his stutter would prove
problematic in performing clerical duties, but was advised by his superiors at Christ
Church that “a deacon might lawfully, if he found himself unfit for the work, abstain
from direct ministerial duty” (qtd. in Collingwood 74). Second, and more significantly,
the Bishop of Oxford, Samuel Wilberforce, told Dodgson that the “resolution to attend
theatres or operas was an absolute disqualification for Holy Orders (qtd. in Collingwood
74). Dodgson was not prepared to cease his theatre attendance, and this dilemma
threatened his position at Christ Church, until he discovered this decree applied only to
the parochial clergy (74). Despite the clear stance of the Church of England on popular
theatre, Dodgson was unwilling to end his attendance, deciding to let his own reasoning
supersede that of his governing institution. Although taking Holy Orders was a
requirement for Dodgson’s Studentship, he waited nine years to be ordained deacon (76).
His nephew and biographer Stuart Dodgson Collingwood believed that Dodgson “never
proceeded to priest’s orders, partly, I think, because he felt that if he were to do so it
would be his duty to undertake regular parochial work,” which would have required him
to completely cease his attendance of the popular theatre (76). Dodgson’s judgment of
morality acts on a scale that relies on justification rather than on a binary that relies on
the rule of authority.
In fact, Dodgson consistently advocates alternatives to established practices and
condemns unwavering policies and institutions that rely solely on binary judgments such
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as true/false or right/wrong. Collingwood writes that while his uncle refused to donate to
any charity that supported vivisection, Dodgson “did not, however, advocate the total
abolition of vivisection—what reasonable man could?” (166). In a letter to the editor of
the Pall Mall Gazette, Dodgson asks, “[h]ow far may vivisection be regarded as a sign of
the times, and a fair specimen of that higher civilization which a purely secular State
education is to give us?” (qtd. in Collingwood 167). Carroll’s choice to use the adjective
“purely” to describe secular education, and his choice to sign the letter Lewis Carroll as
opposed to Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, informs readers of his middle-ground stance, of
his synthesis of religion and science. Later in the letter, Carroll answers his own question,
stating that “[s]elfishness is the keynote of all purely secular education; and I take
vivisection to be a glaring, a wholly unmistakable case in point” (qtd. in Collingwood
170). While Carroll personally finds vivisection to be abhorrent, he does recognize that,
under appropriate circumstances, it can serve a beneficial purpose. Or, put another way,
he opposes vivisection as a Reverend, a religious (i.e. moral) figure, but supports the
possibility of vivisection as a scientist (an instructor of logic).
Carroll’s preface to Sylvie and Bruno contains a much more explicit example of
compromise between religion and education. In this preface, Carroll outlines four
additional books that he desires to be written, by himself should he have the time (he
didn’t). The first of these books is a Child’s Bible. Carroll believes such a Child’s Bible
should be passages chosen for their suitability for a child, not for suitability to religious
policy and education. As such, he believes that “Religion should be put before a child as
a revelation of love—no need to pain and puzzle the young mind with the history of
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crime and punishment. (On such a principle I should, for example, omit the history of the
Flood)” (280). Once again, Carroll reveals his strategy of synthesis, choosing to omit one
of the most well-known events of the Bible because it may harm and puzzle young
readers. The message, according to Carroll, is more important than the method; likewise,
the effect on the child is more important than obedience to established Christian dogma.
Second, Carroll desires “a book of pieces selected from the Bible—not single
texts, but passages . . . to be committed to memory. Such passages would be found useful,
to repeat to one’s-self and to ponder over” (281). While this may seem similar to the rote
style of learning prevalent in religious and school institutions, the small number of
passages, along with the goal of repetition and reflection, allow readers’ knowledge to
develop, to evolve. Such repetition to one’s-self also eliminates the teacher/student
binary, synthesizing the two opposite positions into one (the child is both the speaker and
the listener, both the teacher and the student). In his explanation for the small number of
passages, Carroll states that “we have no means of recalling single texts: memory needs
links and here are none” (281). This emphasis on links explains why Carroll uses so many
instances of parody, pastiche, and satire in his text: while the specific reference or target
of parody, pastiche, or satire may be lost, memory can still assist in understanding the
function of these references. Carroll’s parody and satire are meant to educate, not to
merely entertain. In a letter to a Miss Dora Abdy, Carroll states that one thing he “want[s]
to convey to other minds is that while the laughter of joy is in full harmony with our
deeper life, the laughter of amusement should be kept apart from it. The danger is too
great of thus learning to look at solemn things in a spirit of mockery, and to seek in them
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opportunities for exercising wit” (Collingwood 331). While his readers are surely
entertained by texts such as Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, Carroll believes that
amusement should not be the only purpose for reading. He also reiterates that his satire is
not meant as mockery, or as an attack, but rather as a tool to enhance education,
knowledge, and understanding, for the benefit of his readers, who are effectively his
students.
Carroll’s work is heavily influenced by his extensive history with both education
and religion. Because his life at both the Rectory at Croft and at Christ Church mixed
religion with education, Carroll treats them as pieces of the same whole. Such
combination of religion and education was not limited to the works of Lewis Carroll; the
1870 Elementary Education Act separated elementary schools from religious institutions.
Though it was passed five years after Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland was published,
this Act was a response to a longstanding concern among Victorian educators. Section
7.1 of the Act states:
It shall not be required as a condition of any child being admitted into or
continuing in the school, that he shall attend or abstain from attending any
Sunday school or any place of religious worship, or that he shall attend
any religious observance or any instruction in religious subjects in the
school or elsewhere, from which observance or instruction he may be
withdrawn by his parent, or that he shall, if withdrawn by his parent,
attend the school on any day exclusively set apart for religious observance
by the religious body to which his parent belongs. (Owen 47-48)
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The Act essentially took control away from religious institutions and gave it to newly
appointed school boards, which would be referred to as “board schools.” If a school
board was found to be in violation of any part of the Act, the Education Department
could legally “declare a school board in default and appoint new additional members”
(Smith 135). Response to this Act was often severe; Conservative leader Benjamin
Disraeli, who would be elected Prime Minster of the United Kingdom in 1874, claimed
that
[y]ou will not intrust the priest or the presbyter with the privilege of
expounding the Holy Scriptures to the scholars; but for that purpose you
are inventing and establishing a new sacerdotal class. The schoolmaster
who will exercise these functions, and who will occupy this position, will
be a member of a class which will in the future exercise an extraordinary
influence upon the history of England and upon the conduct of
Englishmen. (Ewald 169)
Disraeli’s claim here is based on the belief that there can be only one institution and form
of education; in this case, the choices are either completely religious or completely
secular. Lewis Carroll’s belief in synthesis addresses and refutes these criticisms.
Attitudes like Disraeli’s persisted into the twentieth century, with many twentiethcentury scholars believing that education should either be purely secular or purely
religious and never a combination of the two. In “Reassessing the ‘Crisis of Faith’ in the
Victorian Age: Eclecticism and the Spirit of Moral Inquiry,” David Nash addresses the
binary pair of what he identifies as the crisis of faith/crisis of doubt. He claims that many
77

early- and mid-twentieth century Victorian historians maintain the belief that Victorian
England either underwent a crisis of faith, where religion was all but destroyed, or a crisis
of doubt, where religion eventually became dominant in Victorian culture. Nash claims,
however, that late-twentieth and twenty-first century historians have begun to accept a
different interpretation of Victorian religion:
New definitions of religious belief and observance have similarly altered
both the dynamic and the nomenclature that characterize what it means to
be sacred or secular. A crucial shift of emphasis in this area of inquiry has
been the recognition that religious belief is capable of a sustained
existence beyond the institutions that dispense it in its purest forms. (66)
This abandonment of, or at least alternative to, the dominant institutions of Victorian
culture is precisely what Lewis Carroll attempts in the Wonderland texts. Carroll does not
parody or satirize religion itself; he parodies and satirizes educational figures,
institutions, and practices. Carroll considered himself to be a Christian, but he took issue
with the unwavering rigidity of religious dogma, such as the Church of England’s stance
on popular theatre. Carroll, therefore, is an example of what Nash calls “Victorian
radicals . . . motivated seekers after credible belief and morality that might be realized
within a culture of exploration and questioning” (71). Nash argues that belief, morality,
knowledge, and understanding should be sought and developed by each individual, not
mass produced and forced upon each and every Victorian citizen, though many of these
“seekers” were not quite ready to abandon their governing institutions altogether. The
very nature of nonsense literature requires questioning, so the works of Lewis Carroll act
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as an example of this improved form of education. However, such reform is precisely
what many Victorian religious institutions feared. They dreaded their loss of control over
education. Bishop Ullathorne wrote of the new board schools that “their constitution,
object and aim was to ‘propagate a system of education in antagonism with Catholic
education, and with all definite religious education’” (Smith 137). Likewise, Bishop
Vaughan of Salford urged that “we cannot do evil that good may come of it. . . . That no
Catholic can vote for any candidate who proposes to saddle the country with a secular
and godless system of education” (qtd. in Smith 138). Not all religious figures took an
overt approach to combat the secularization of English schools; in 1873, Canons John
Cromwell and Robert Gregory of the Church of England and Dr. James Harrison Rigg, a
Wesleyan Methodist minister, “created an interdenominational alliance to protect existing
denominational schools, attacking the Board’s building programme as profligate and
deeming the existing provision as adequate” in an attempt to circumvent the Act instead
of condemning it (Smith 137). Religious figures such as these, being unable to alter their
dogmatic practices in order to compromise, believed that there was only one right (in
both factual and moral senses) way to educate children: their way. Their inability to
compromise resulted in a significant reduction in the number of and funding for religious
elementary schools.
Nash further addresses the conflict between religion and secularization in
“Laughing at the Almighty: Freethinking Lampoon, Satire, and Parody in Victorian
England.” One of his main goals in this essay is to convince his readers that many
Victorian writers, both religious and secular, found religion to be “a monolithic and all-
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pervasive influence on the culture of the society in which they lived” (44). Though
Victorian laws regarding blasphemy protected Christianity from most forms of attack,
Victorian writers were able to utilize areas of popular culture to both overtly and covertly
parody, satirize, and lampoon sacred institutions. Lewis Carroll was careful to avoid any
direct attack on religion and religious institutions in his Wonderland texts; there are no
characters that represent religion in either text; even the chess-piece bishops are missing
(at least nominally) from Through the Looking-Glass.
Nash begins his essay with a brief examination of the job of cultural historians in
analyzing humor. He writes:
[T]here are numerous episodes in more recent cultural history where the
“joke” is not so much not understood but that the full depth of its humor
and the relevance of its attacks upon powerful institutions and individuals
are lost upon a contemporary audience. Thus there are occasions where the
cultural gulf is not nearly so great, enabling the joke to be “got,” but its
significance may be misunderstood or more often, and importantly, may
be dismissed as juvenile or simply offensive. (43)
In order to apply this statement to the Wonderland texts, the term “nonsense” or, more
accurately, “metasense” should be added to Nash’s description of the significance of
historical jokes. For example, many modern readers of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland
would understand that “Twinkle Twinkle Little Bat” is a parody of, or at least a reference
to, “Twinkle Twinkle Little Star,” and most who recognize the song remember the tune to
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which it is sung. However, few would understand the cultural and religious purposes of
such nursery rhymes from over two hundred years ago.
This song was first published in 1806 by sisters Ann and Jane Taylor in Rhymes
for the Nursery, under the name “The Star.” In their preface, the Taylor sisters address
the issue of “[w]hether ideas adapted to the comprehension of infancy, admit the
restrictions of rhyme and meter?” (iii). The Hatter’s singing of “[t]winkle, twinkle, little
bat! / How I wonder what you’re at!” in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland would have
been immediately recognizable to a Victorian reader of this text (79). However, there
exists an immediate and significant contradiction between the original and the parody.
Any person who has seen a star can understand that these celestial objects twinkle. If a
child looked up on a clear night in Victorian England, he or she would have seen
thousands of twinkling stars, though the child may “know not what [they] are” (Taylor
11). The poem and the image of the star would have been everyday objects to a Victorian
child. The parody, however, subverts the purpose of the original poem. Rather than
portraying an object that nearly every sighted individual has experienced, Carroll changes
the object into a bat. Though still relatively commonplace in Victorian England, these
creatures still act as a vehicle for nonsense in the poem. Victorian children would know
that a bat does not twinkle, which would cause a rift between what they read and what
they know. Whether they are conscious of this rift or not, Victorian readers would be
aware that the Hatter is misrepresenting his knowledge, both of the original poem and of
the nature of bats. Therefore, while “Twinkle Twinkle Little Bat” is a parody of “The
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Star,” the Hatter functions to satirize the Taylor sisters and nursery rhymes as educational
tools.
The discrepancy between stars and bats is not the only form of satire in this
parody. The parodied poem does not include a version of the third, and central, stanza (of
five) of the original:
Then the trav’ller in the dark
Thanks you for your tiny spark:
He could not see which way to go,
If you did not twinkle so. (10)
The original poem instructs children that even though they may not fully comprehend
something, in this case a star, they can still understand its purpose (in the religious, not
the scientific, sense). The bat, like the Hatter’s version of the poem, has no purpose. Or
rather, the poem serves a different purpose in Wonderland than the original did in
Victorian England. “The Star” was meant to be read or sung to young children until they
remembered it by heart and understood its message as truth. “Twinkle Twinkle Little
Bat,” however, informs readers that information should be evaluated on an individual
basis, not determined by the authority of the speaker. By parodying this well-known
poem, Carroll criticizes the Victorian emphasis on memorization and rote learning and
emphasizes the idea that information should be valued based on personal experience,
what Aristotle describes as phronesis or practical wisdom. Leslie Paul Thiele explains
practical wisdom as “an aptitude for assessing, evaluating, and choosing in the absence of
certainties principles that dictate or generate right answers” (5). A Victorian child,
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especially a Christian child, would be able to understand the concept of a bright star
being used to guide a wayward traveler. Such guidance has value; after all, the star is
compared to a diamond. That child would likely not, however, believe that a bat would
provide the same guidance. A bat is simply a mundane, commonplace thing, similar to
the tea-tray to which the bat is compared in the Hatter’s version of “The Star.” The Hatter
here replaces objects in the rhyme, which creates a nonsensical parody of the original;
however, by doing so, he establishes a situation in which a reader may question the
original objects and their purpose, and by extension the purpose of the rhyme itself.
The Hatter’s name itself is another example of how, like Alice, Victorian readers
found the Hatter to be a purveyor of nonsense. Although he is only ever called “Hatter”
in the original story, he quickly became known as the “Mad Hatter.” This may be in part
due to the expression “mad as a hatter” being popular since well before the novel was
published. It may also be in part because the chapter that the Hatter first appears in is
titled “A Mad Tea-Party.” It may be because, shortly after mentioning the Hatter and the
March Hare for the first time, the Cheshire Cat tells Alice “we’re all mad here” (72).
None of these possibilities can be conclusively considered as the sole, correct answer to
this question. As Carroll so frequently teaches his readers, there is no single answer; all
are equally justifiable, and the issue of his name is strengthened by a synthesis of all
possible reasons, rather than selecting which reason is the “right” one.
Similar to how Nash characterizes cultural historians, the purpose of this thesis is
to “rejuvenat[e] [contexts] that have become a faint and dusty memory in
contemporaries” (44). One prime example of this rejuvenation can be found in the first
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lyrical parody of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. Alice recites the poem “How doth
the little—” while attempting to answer her question to herself, “[w]ho in the world am
I?” (28-29). Alice’s version reads:
“How doth the little crocodile
Improve his shining tail,
And pour the waters of the Nile
On every golden scale!
How cheerfully he seems to grin
How neatly spreads his claws
And welcomes little fishes in,
With gently smiling jaws! (29)
This parody describes a crocodile devouring its prey, a subject very different than the
original. Alice’s version parodies Isaac Watts’ 1715 poem “Against Idleness and
Mischief” from Divine Songs Attempted in Easy Language for the Use of Children. These
titles alone illustrate the purpose of the source poem; as written in the introduction to An
Explanation of Dr. Watts’s Hymns for Children, in Question and Answer, the poems are
“for the instruction of children brought up in the principles of [the Established] Church . .
. [for] the spiritual instruction of . . . little ones” (iv). “Against Idleness and Mischief” is
an especially potent poem for parody; the very first line of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland reads “Alice was beginning to get very tired of sitting by her sister on the
bank and of having nothing to do” (17). Alice begins the story by being idle, and shortly
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thereafter pursues a rabbit in a waistcoat down a rabbit hole, leading her into mischief.
The first stanza of Watts’ poem reads:
How doth the little busy bee
Improve each shining hour,
And gather honey all the day
From ev’ry op’ning flow’r. (75)
A busy bee gathering honey is a natural process, just like a crocodile eating fish; the
substitution of crocodile/fish for bee/honey is a feasible one, unlike the Hatter’s
substitution of a bat for a star. However, Watts’ explanation of his poem is very different
from Alice’s interpretation. After the main text, the author asks “what is the honey which
we are to gather?” (76). The response, “[i]nstruction from the Word of God,” reveals the
biblical (and metaphorical rather than literal) meaning behind the poem. Although a
young child may not understand what a bee or honey has to do with religious instruction,
he or she would still be expected to listen to the poem and the explanation, and to take
them as truth. Alice knows that her recitation is incorrect, but her response, “I’m sure
those are not the right words,” focuses on the words that she had to memorize, not on the
purpose of the lesson (29). Alice, at this point in the story, considers the rote
memorization of her school lessons to be the most important, indeed the only, form of
knowledge and identity. She uses this recitation to test that she is not Alice; she creates
her identity based solely on what others have taught her. Shortly after deciding she does
not know who she is, Alice literally changes size, adding a physical loss of identity to her
previous psychological loss. Lewis Carroll then spends the rest of the story rebuilding
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Alice’s identity based on her own experiences, rather than on (and in many cases in direct
contradiction to) what the Wonderland residents tell her to do.
Although rote forms of religious instruction, such as nursery rhymes, are a
common point of parody in the Wonderland texts, Lewis Carroll also satirizes the content
of much religious education. Brian Gibson claims that “[m]orals, it seems, are pointless
in Wonderland” (7). The Duchess from Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland is the best
example of Wonderland morality; she lectures Alice at length about the topic. In Chapter
IX, the Duchess tells Alice “[e]verything’s got a moral, if only you can find it” (96). This
short statement contains two very important pieces of satire. First, the Duchess’ claim
reflects a focal point of common religious education of the Victorian era: morality. For
example, Isaac Watts’ collection of poetry, parodied earlier in Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, contains several pages of questions and answers dealing with the moral
aspects of each poem. Second, and more important, is the Duchess’ use of the word
“you.” Normally, a religious figure determines morality and a student is taught simply to
memorize established morals. In Wonderland, however, Alice is tasked with determining
this morality for herself. There are no suitable authority figures to tell Alice how to think
and feel. The Duchess attempts to do so, but Alice must consistently correct her. At one
point, the Duchess says “flamingoes and mustard both bite. And the moral of that is—
‘Birds of a feather flock together’” (97). Alice is quick to point out that “mustard isn’t a
bird,” to which the Duchess responds that Alice is correct (97). Alice then mistakenly
describes mustard as a mineral, to which the Duchess makes a moral statement on mines;
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when Alice corrects herself and calls mustard a vegetable, the Duchess responds with yet
another moral. The Duchess at first says,
the moral of that is—‘Be what you would seem to be’—or, if you’d like it put
more simply—‘Never imagine yourself not to be otherwise than what it might
appear to others that what you were or might have been was not otherwise than
what you had been would have appeared to them to be otherwise. (98)
This now infamous “simple” explanation is far too complicated for Alice, who says, “I
think I should understand that better . . . if I had it written down: but I ca’n’t quite follow
it as you say it” (98). The Duchess’ line is not something a Victorian person would likely
utter in standard conversation. Carroll here parodies one typical strategy of moralizing
authority figures: If put in a situation where said figures cannot justify their stance,
statement, or moral, they respond with something so complicated that the listener cannot
understand. While Alice is a victim of this strategy, believing the failure is in her
comprehension and not in the Duchess’ speech, readers are not; Lecercle, commenting on
the Duchess’ speech, notes that “the joke is on us. As we read “I think I should
understand that better . . . if I had it written down,” we are bitterly reminded that we have
it written down, and that we cannot follow it at all” (57). This sentence even crosses the
boundaries of the genre. In nonsense, multiplicity of meaning pervades the text.
However, because the complexity of the sentence lies in syntax and not semantics, “no
interpretation whatsoever crosses the reader’s mind,” there is only confusion (Lecercle
57-58). The Duchess’ complicated utterance is, therefore, true non-sense; it does not
contain any understandable meaning (in traditional sense), but it also does not call for a
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response on the part of the listener (as in literary nonsense). Because it lacks even partial
meaning, it is ignored, both by Alice and by most readers of the text.
Carroll’s strategy of synthesis for the good of education manifests itself
throughout the Wonderland texts. By parodying and satirizing Victorian religious and
educational institutions, Lewis Carroll presents alternative forms of education based
entirely on potential benefits to students.
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CHAPTER V
LEWIS CARROLL AND SATIRE OF CLASSROOM EDUCATION

Nonsense literature, as described in Chapter II of this thesis, is closely related to
the Victorian classroom. Therefore, the works of Lewis Carroll, as part of this genre,
satirize both educational figures and the classroom itself. The Wonderland texts portray
several significant educational figures: the stuffy, know-it-all Caterpillar, who merely
tells Alice she is wrong; the Mock Turtle and Gryphon, who describe their experiences in
their under-sea school and compare this school to Alice’s education; and Humpty
Dumpty, who adopts the role of literary critic to explain the meaning of the
“Jabberwocky” poem to Alice.
Alice demonstrates her inability to properly utilize her school lessons almost
immediately upon entering Wonderland:
“I must be getting somewhere near the centre of the earth. Let me see: that
would be four thousand miles down, I think—” (for, you see, Alice had
learnt several things of this sort in her lessons in the school-room, and
though this was not a very good opportunity for showing off her
knowledge, as there was no one to listen to her, still it was good practice
to say it over). (19)
Though Alice could use such knowledge of geography to attempt to identify her position
in the earth, she instead believes that the purpose of knowing the distance to the center of
the earth is to either show off her knowledge (thus proving she is a “good” student) or to
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repeat it (to ensure that she can show off her knowledge). The fact that the narrator
intervenes to explain the reason for Alice’s recitation provides readers with Lewis
Carroll’s beliefs, as a teacher, on the purpose of education. Carroll believes that students
who simply memorize the facts, or what they have learned, are not well educated; these
students must also understand why they are learning these lessons and how to apply this
knowledge to their life. Successful students must be able to find an answer to a question
they have not been taught, using thought processes that they have learned in similar
situations, but Alice does not understand this. When falling down the rabbit-hole, “Alice
began to get rather sleepy, and went on saying to herself, in a dreamy sort of way, ‘Do
cats eat bats? Do cats eat bats?’ and sometimes ‘Do bats eat cats?’ for, you see, as she
couldn’t answer either question, it didn’t much matter which way she put it” (20). Alice
does not take the time to consider the different parts of the question, because she has not
been taught the proper answer. Lecercle says of this situation that
Alice, “in a dreamy sort of way,” is playing with the words without paying
attention to their differential value, as children and nonsense texts are apt
to do. In other words . . . the “bat”/“cat” episode subverts the code by
describing a possible playful exploitation of the rules (36).
Alice, then, acts as a toddler would, playing with the words to see how she can say them,
with no consideration for their individual meaning. I am reminded of my two-year-old
cousin who, upon hearing my aunt yell “crap” when she made a mistake, repeated the
word seven or eight times, in varying pronunciations, to experiment with the word itself.
She had no knowledge of what the word meant, and was not provided with a definition or
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explanation. She did not care; she learned to say the word anyway. Children who speak in
this way are unaware of the rules of language, and thus do not learn much from lessons
that rely solely on this form of repetition. Alice demonstrates such an instance when, as
she first encounters the mouse, she attempts to address it in English. When the mouse
does not respond, she addresses it in French, thinking it came over with William the
Conqueror, for, “with all her knowledge of history, Alice had no very clear notion of how
long ago anything had happened” (32). Despite clearly having learned these history
lessons, and memorized the names, dates, locations, etc. of the events, Alice does not
understand how these events relate to her, to other history lessons, or to Victorian
England or Wonderland. She has memorized the information, but not been taught how to
apply it. Just as one report to the School Board of London indicated that “it was not
uncommon ‘to find a child able to indicate readily the exact position on a map of
Flamborough Head or Airdnamurchan Point, and at the same time fail to give satisfactory
proof that it understands the meaning of a map’” (qtd. in Horn 8). After reciting the
distance to the center of the earth, Alice wonders “what Latitude or Longitude I’ve got
to?” (Alice had not the slightest idea what Latitude was, or Longitude either, but she
thought they were nice grand words to say.)” (19). Alice, like the aforementioned
students of geography, has memorized her lessons through repetition but has not learned
how to properly apply them outside of the classroom. While these geography students
have succeeded in their lessons, that is memorized them, they have not understood the
purpose of such lessons and are not prepared to apply them to the real world, much in the
same way as Alice. This disconnect between the memorization of school lessons and their
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application in Victorian England is satirized through Carroll’s comparisons between
Wonderland and Victorian England.
Alice further demonstrates an inability to properly apply her school lessons when,
after growing too large for Bill’s cottage, she exclaims to herself, “[t]here ought to be a
book written about me, that there ought! And when I grow up, I’ll write one—but I’m
grown up now,” she added in a sorrowful tone: “at least there’s no room to grow up any
more here” (45). Alice mistakes growing physically for maturing or gaining knowledge
and experience, not realizing that she can learn from her experiences outside of the
schoolroom. She further demonstrates her mistaken belief that she can only learn while in
a school when she states to herself “[h]ow can you learn lessons in here? Why, there’s
hardly room for you, and no room at all for lesson-books!” (45). She does not understand
that her school lessons can be applied to her life experiences, and vice versa.
Lewis Carroll satirizes two primary types of faulty educational figures: those who
focus on recitation as opposed to understanding and those who believe in only one
possible interpretation. The character of the Caterpillar exemplifies the instructor who is
more concerned with recitation than with conveying knowledge. When the Caterpillar
asks Alice to recite “You are old, Father William,” she recites an altered version. The
Caterpillar tells Alice “[t]hat is not said right . . . It is wrong from beginning to end,” with
no explanation of how Alice may improve her recitation. Lecercle believes that, in this
situation, the Caterpillar alters the teacher/student relationship to one of teacher/vehicle
for recitation:
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The question “Who meant that, if Alice did not mean it?” looms large.
And we note that the Caterpillar does not say “you said that wrong,” but
“that is not said right,” a passive without an agent. Poor Alice is reduced
to the state of a tape recorder, a possessed mystic or a raving lunatic. The
words that come out of her mouth are not hers. (118)
Interestingly, Alice does actually act as a vehicle; she is a vehicle for Lewis Carroll’s
nonsense, for his satire of Victorian education, and through this satire as a vehicle for
presenting his educational beliefs. If students are not part of the primary relationship with
their instructors, such as the situation between Alice and the Caterpillar, they cannot learn
how to utilize and apply their lessons. Rather, such students represent
[t]he interpellation cum exclusion of pedagogic dialogue: the addressee
stands up, which makes her stand out, to hear the sentence assessed on her
performance. The jocularity of the intervention is characteristic of the fake
chumminess of pedagogic address. The narrator of nonsense tales makes
the pedagogic nature of all narrative relationships explicit. The school is
always somehow present in the text, explicitly so in nonsense. (Lecercle
215)
Students’ recitations in such situations are not for their own benefit; rather, they are
meant to be an example for other students to learn from. As such, the students who are
forced to recite in front of their classmates are not meant to learn anything; in fact, they
are not part of the teacher/student relationship at all. Rather, their role is to function
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primarily as a tool, a subject, an example through which teachers educate their other
students.
Even the driving purpose of Victorian education was flawed. Charles Dickens’
1854 novel Hard Times satirizes educational figures who focus solely on memorization.
The novel begins with Thomas Gradgrind speaking in a classroom:
Now, what I want is, Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts
alone are wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can
only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of
any service to them. This is the principle on which I bring up my own children,
and this is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir! (9)
Facts are so immensely important to Gradgrind that he insists on capitalizing the word,
treating it as a proper noun, a type of deity. He condemns the other half of the binary,
Fancy, and allows for no Carrollian synthesis between the two. Later in the story,
Gradgrind repeats this binary, albeit with different terms:
“Some persons hold,” he pursed, still hesitating, “that there is a wisdom of the
Head, and that there is a wisdom of the Heart. I have not supposed so; but, as I
have said, I mistrust myself now. I have supposed the head to be all-sufficient. It
may not be all sufficient.” (217)
Gradgrind has realized his mistaken belief in Fact, in wisdom of the Head, as the only
form of knowledge. The narrator, in the final chapter of the novel, provides a third similar
binary: that of present and future. Fact, the wisdom of the Head, the present, these are all
things that can be proven either correct or incorrect. There is nothing left to be done with
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them by students other than memorization. Fancy, the wisdom of the head, the future,
these are all things that cannot be proven correct or incorrect, that possess the possibility
for a multiplicity of meaning, of knowledge. Put plainly, Fact represents the realm of
knowledge, while Fancy represents the realm of belief (albeit not in the religious sense)
and wonder. A belief, like a hypothesis, can and should be justified, be explained,
according to Carroll. Mr. Gradgrind is not alone in his steadfast beliefs; his wife, Mrs.
Gradgrind, orders her daughter Lousia to “never wonder!” (52). These two words
embody, according to the narrator, “the spring of the mechanical art and mystery of
educating the reason without stooping to the cultivation of the sentiments and affections.
Never wonder” (53). These words contrast sharply with the very title of Alice’s
Adventures in Wonderland, with the entire realm of Wonderland. Like Mr. Gradgrind,
Mrs. Gradgrind proves herself wrong when, on her deathbed, she asks for a pen with
which to write her husband. She does not receive a pen, but “[s]he fancied, however, that
her request had been complied with, and that the pen she could not have held was in her
hand. It matters little what figures of wonderful no-meaning she began to trace upon her
wrappers” (194). Despite her husband’s adamant belief in fact, Mrs. Gradgrind descends
into fancy. Despite not actually writing anything, her action has meaning. Her nomeaning contains within it a purpose. Her no-meaning means, much in the same way that
literary nonsense contains sense, if one can only look beyond the realm of Fact. Mr.
Gradgrind’s educational ideology led to the term “gradgrind” being used to describe
somebody concerned solely with fact, with science, with provable knowledge to be
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memorized. Such educational figures anticipated the Revised Code of Education, which
standardized such modes of learning in Victorian public schools.
Beginning with the Revised Code of Education in 1862, Victorian schools
received their funding based on the results of their students in examination in the three
R’s: reading, writing, and arithmetic, plus attendance (Horn 2). As a result, many schools
taught only those three subjects, so that their students would perform adequately in
examination, while neglecting additional subjects that would require students to spend
less time on the three R’s. For nearly thirty years, students were taught that their
educational goals were to score well on examination, not to learn:
For more than one generation of teachers and scholars . . . the daily routine
became an unremitting grind in the three Rs, with constant repetition and
rote learning the normal method of instruction. Individual initiative was
crushed, as teachers endeavored to meet the conditions of the Code, and
discipline was severe. (Horn 5)
This system would endure until 1890, when the government began phasing it out,
although annual examinations remained in some subjects until the mid-1890s (Horn 8).
Although Carroll satirizes this system, he is careful not to attack the instructors. After all,
educational policy is not entirely their fault. In many cases, teacher salaries depended on
the examination-based grants from the government, which constituted the entire funding
for board-based schools. For example,
in 1888, the newly-appointed headmaster of Charlbury Board School,
Oxfordshire, received a basic salary of £50 a year, plus 20 per cent of the
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grant; his principal female assistant received £50 a year plus 10 per cent of
the grant; and the second female assistant a meagre £15 per annum and 5
per cent of the grant. (Horn 11)
Instructors were hired by schools based on their ability to train students in the art of test
taking, not on the ability to provide understanding of their lessons. Carroll satirizes this
style of educator with the Caterpillar, who appears useless when removed from the
economic reality of the Victorian schoolroom.
Humpty Dumpty stands as the perfect example of the second style of educator
that Carroll finds issue with: an instructor who believes in only one possible
interpretation. His famous claim that “[w]hen I use a word . . . it means just what I choose
it to mean—neither more nor less” demonstrates his refusal to compromise, to synthesize,
or to accept other interpretations (214). This dogmatism contrasts sharply with Carroll’s
strategy of synthesis and of multiplicity of knowledge in and through explanation.
Expanding on his stance on words, Humpty Dumpty exclaims: “They’ve a temper, some
of them—particularly verbs: they’re the proudest—adjectives you can do anything with,
but not verbs—however I can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s
what I say” (214). When Alice asks Humpty Dumpty to explain himself, he responds by
stating “I meant by ‘impenetrability’ that we’ve had enough of that subject, and it would
be just as well if you’d mention what you mean to do next, as I suppose you don’t meant
to stop here all the rest of your life” (214). Alice responds that “[t]hat’s a great deal to
make one word mean,” pointing out a flaw in Humpty Dumpty’s logic: an unnecessarily
broad or complicated meaning does not convey knowledge, especially when some of that
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meaning has nothing to do with the word itself (214). Humpty Dumpty then proceeds to
define Carroll’s coined words from “Jabberwocky,” and many readers of Through the
Looking-Glass have taken his explanations as satisfactory definitions of these new words.
However, Lecercle identifies two main flaws with Humpty Dumpty’s reasoning. First, he
states that a reader “can never be certain that the ‘coined’ word one discovers in a text
does not have existence, and conventional meaning, in a larger dictionary or specialised
jargon” (29). Such instances are commonplace in classrooms; students are often
introduced to words they have never heard before, but are asked to treat instructors’
definitions as truth. Readers, like students, must consider several questions in response to
Humpty Dumpty’s explanation. If Carroll’s coined words exist in Wonderland English,
but not in Victorian English, how should readers like Alice and Humpty Dumpty
respond? Can a word, paradoxically, exist simultaneously (in Wonderland) and not exist
(in Victorian England)? Should readers treat these coined words as both existing
(meaning precisely what Humpty Dumpty claims they mean), and not existing (they
would not be present in a Victorian English dictionary) at the same time? Humpty
Dumpty defines what he believes these words may mean, but acts as though he knows
their only meaning. In his preface to “The Hunting of the Snark,” Lewis Carroll explains
the formation of one such portmanteau from “Jabberwocky”:
take the two words “fuming” and “furious.” Make up your mind that you
will say both words, but leave it unsettled which you will say first. Now
open your mouth and speak. If your thoughts incline ever so little towards
“fuming,” you will say “fuming-furious;” if they turn, by even a hair’s
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breadth, towards “furious,” you will say “furious-fuming;” but if you have
that rarest of gifts, a perfectly balanced mind, you will say “frumious.”
(754)
Carroll’s explanation exemplifies his belief in synthesis and in explanation; the nonsense
word “frumious” is here an example of synthesis between the two standard responses and
an explanation of how he believes explanation to be superior to strict adherence to
standard rules. He does not claim that “frumious” is correct while both “fuming-furious”
and “furious-fuming” are incorrect; he considers all to be acceptable, depending on the
individual who utters the word(s). His belief in synthesis goes so far as result in the
creation of entirely new words. Ironically, Humpty Dumpty’s (possibly) false definitions
of the nonsense words from “Jabberwocky” have entered the English lexicon, but
Lecercle reveals Humpty Dumpty’s second flaw, a flaw with these definitions: “Humpty
Dumpty’s explanations are semantic, whereas the rules for the formation of portmanteauwords are morphological” (44). Thus, Humpty Dumpty stands as an example of one of
the most dangerous types of teachers: those who attempt to explain something, and do so
incorrectly, but because they claim their way is the only way, convey a false education to
their poor students.
One way that Carroll believes an educator can combat poor education, in the
manner of Humpty Dumpty, is through justification and explanation. He uses the
characters of the Mock Turtle and the Gryphon to parody good educators (thus
illustrating his non-standard use of parody), and these two characters bear many
similarities to Carroll himself. After spending some time with the Mock Turtle and
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Gryphon, Alice thinks to herself, “[h]ow the creatures order one about, and make one
repeat lessons. . . . I might just as well be at school at once” (111). Alice connects these
creatures with her understanding of teachers. This understanding emphasizes the Mock
Turtle’s statement to Alice after her recitation of “Tis the voice of the sluggard.” He asks
her, “[w]hat is the use of repeating all that stuff . . . if you don’t explain it as you go on?”
and the Gryphon adds, “[y]es, I think you’d better leave off” (112). Both of these figures
understand that Alice has not truly learned anything from her school lessons if she is
unable to explain what she has memorized. This is not a flaw in Alice, however; it is a
flaw with the entire educational system of Victorian England
The Mock Turtle’s name is another example of Carroll’s satire of rote learning; he
is a nonsense creature, something that does not exist outside of Wonderland. He
“embodies a mistake in immediate constituent analysis which presupposes the possibility
of a correct analysis” (Lecercle 41). When the Queen asks Alice if she has met the Mock
Turtle, Alice responds, “I don’t even know what a Mock Turtle is” (99). The Queen then
explains the Mock Turtle in relation to mock turtle soup, as if it were hyphenated mockturtle soup (a soup made from the fictional mock-turtle) rather than the Victorian mock
turtle-soup (a soup made from brains and organ meats). Lecercle identifies similar
creatures, present in the Wonderland texts through the illustrations of Sir John Tenniel,
such as the bread-and-butter fly (instead of bread and butterfly) and rocking-horse fly
(rather than rocking horse-fly). He claims that these illustrations, and by extent the
creatures themselves, are paradoxical rather than wrong; he uses the real-world example
of an English speaker analyzing “hamburger” into “ham” and “burger” rather than
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“Hamburg” and “er” to show how these mistakes are those that a child, operating under
the basic rules of linguistics, would be inclined to make (41-42). Rather than simply
being incorrect, because they are not the original meaning, Carroll accepts the
Wonderland explanations of these creatures as truth, because such explanations are
logically sound.
Another explanation for the poor quality of Victorian educators, in addition to
their standardized modes of education, comes from the fact that “[i]n the early nineteenth
century, elementary teaching was often taken up by those too old, too sick or too
inefficient to earn their living in any other way,” and that the income of teachers was less
than what able-bodied laborers would receive (Horn 163). Such teachers had no other
methods through which to earn their income, and were often poorly trained, if at all:
the work of adult teachers in National and British and Foreign Society
schools was normally supplemented by child monitors. They were drawn
from the older pupils and taught their fellow scholars under the
supervising eye of a single adult, who might have been briefly “trained”
for that role at one of the central schools run by the two societies. But
often no such instruction had been given and, in these circumstances,
teaching degenerated into a monotonous routine of repetitive chanting and
rote learning. Little attempt was made to arouse the pupils’ interest or
reasoning powers. (Horn 164-65)
While possibilities for teacher education existed in Victorian England, they were not
required, and many instructors preferred to begin teaching immediately, for economic
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reasons, rather than to polish their educational abilities. The result was educators who
either thought they were good instructors when, in fact, they were not (like the Duchess),
or instructors who simply parroted information, relying on rote learning and
memorization as their only form of education (like the Caterpillar).
One of the most significant instances of educational satire in Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland is the courtroom scene, which bears many similarities to Victorian
classrooms. The chaotic nature of the Wonderland courtroom is intimately connected to
Victorian education. Due to the significant increase in the number of students in the
middle part of the nineteenth century, English schools were often held wherever space
was available:
In 1870, the overall principle of design remained much what it had been a
quarter of a century earlier, when voluntary providers were advised that a
barn or a warehouse would offer a suitable model for a school. Children
were taught within one large room, perhaps subdivided by partitions or
curtains, but with little genuine separation between the classes. (Horn 36)
One Joseph Ashby recalls his youth, in which six different classes worked together in the
same schoolroom: “[s]everal children would be reading aloud, teachers scolding, infants
reciting, all waxing louder and louder until the master rang the bell on his desk and the
noise slid down to a lower note and less volume” (qtd. in Horn 37). Such chaos is readily
apparent in the courtroom scene, where too many Wonderland residents are trying to
speak and listen at the same time. When the King of Hearts asks when the mad tea party
began, the Dormouse, March Hare, and Hatter all respond with different dates, which
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results in the jury writing all three down, adding them together, and then converting the
numbers into currency (117). A question that originally involved chronology transforms
into one of currency, and the entire system is thrown into confusion. The jury, with their
slates and pencils, all listening to these (flawed) testimonies, reflects students of
Victorian one-room schoolhouses, who are forced into a position where they do not
understand what they are being told but are unable to ask for clarification or justification
from their instructors.
The moderator of the Wonderland courtroom, The King, also represents a poorly
qualified instructor who contributes to the chaos:
“That’s very important,” the King said, turning to the jury. They were just
beginning to write this down on their slates, when the White Rabbit
interrupted: “Unimportant, your Majesty means, of course,” he said, in a
very respectful tone, but frowning and making faces at him as he spoke.
“Unimportant, of course, I meant,” the King hastily said, and went on to
himself in an undertone, “important—unimportant—unimportant—
important—” as if he were trying which word sounded best. Some of the
jury wrote down “important,” and some “unimportant.” (124)
The King is more concerned with which word sounds better, not which word conveys
what he means. As a result, some of his “students” have written down one of these words,
while the rest have written down the other, and consequently, the trial cannot be properly
concluded. The King’s indecision regarding the words “important” and “unimportant”
may stem from the ambiguity of apparently negative prefixes like “in-” as in the case of
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flammable/inflammable and habitable/inhabitable, where the meaning is not altered as it
is in important/unimportant, though un- and in- are not the same (Lecercle 90-91). This
coincides with Carroll’s belief in justification; for, in English grammar, there are often
exceptions to the rules, so students must understand the reasons behind such rules rather
than simply memorizing them.
Unfortunately, if instructors like the King do not completely understand their own
lessons, they will not be able to respond to any student questions, and this may result in
an attack against a student, such as the Queen’s continued exclamation of “off with her
head!” Another such attack comes from the Lory15 to Alice, who states, “I’m older than
you, and must know better,” but refuses to state its age. Such problems arise when one of
the major requirements for Victorian educators is simply to be eighteen years of age.
Even if students are somehow able to understand the reasons for their lessons, they still
likely lack the ability to properly explain or utilize them, much like Alice when she first
enters Wonderland. After having been engulfed in the Pool of Tears, the Wonderland
residents search for a way to dry themselves. The Mouse claims to know the solution, and
promptly recites a history lesson:
“Edwin and Morcar, the earls of Mercia and Northumbria, declared for
him; and even Stigand, the patriotic archbishop of Canterbury, found it
advisable—”
“Found what?”
“Found it,” the mouse replied rather crossly: “of course you know what
“it” means.”
15

Many scholars have theorized that the Lory refers to Alice’s elder sister, Lorina Liddell.
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“I know what “it” means well enough, when I find a thing,” said the Duck.
(36)
Unfortunately, the Mouse has confused two definitions of the word “dry,” and attempted
to remove moisture from the Wonderland residents with an uninteresting piece of a
history lesson. Likewise, both the Mouse and the Duck understand what the word “it”
represents when they use the word, but neither possesses adequate understanding of their
grammar lessons to explain pronoun usage. These characters also embody a major issue
with unqualified Victorian educators. Such educators may understand the basics of their
lessons, and be able to simply teach what they are instructed to teach, but lack sufficient
proficiency in the topics to respond to student questions regarding their lessons. The
mouse ignores the Duck’s second appeal of “[t]he question is, what did the archbishop
find?” and continues reciting the history lesson, failing to help its audience understand
the history passage (36).
Victorian educators were not the only problem; with the standardization of
education, textbooks and lessons themselves became problematic. Textbooks and lessons
had to be designed to be easy for teachers to understand and to teach, as well as for
students to understand and repeat. The result was that these textbooks often failed to
appropriately educate students, rather they taught what would more accurately be
described as nonsense or trivia: “textbooks naturally draw on all sorts of texts and
discourses. In Victorian textbooks, the result was often absurd, an absurdity which
nonsense barely exaggerates” (Lecercle 215). Such textbooks attempted to incorporate
aspects of Victorian culture into lessons, without explaining how those aspects relate to
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the lessons, and the result is true nonsense, with the method and content having no
explanation or relation. Rote learning, especially in the forms of tables, lists, and
preformed constructions (i.e. grammar), was thus easy to memorize even if no teacher
was present. Unfortunately, such lessons could rarely be applied to Victorian life.
Lecercle refers to an account (indirectly through Brian Simons) of the Westminster
Review’s description of grammar schools in July 1825:
From six or eight, till sixteen or seventeen, nine or ten months in every
precious year of youth are occupied, for six or eight hours of every day, in
learning, or trying to learn, a little Latin and less Greek; in attempting, in
fact, not to read and understand the matter of a classical author, to know
the history, the poetry, the philosophy, the policy, the manners, and the
opinions of Greece and Rome, but the grammar, the syntax, the parsing,
the quantities, and the accents; not in learning to write and speak the
languages, but in getting by rote a few scraps of poetry, to be again
forgotten, and in fabricating nonsense, or sense verses, it is indifferent
which.” (156)
Lecercle believes that these formed sentences truly lack sense, “because they are written
with a view to grammatical correctness and metrical regularity, not as a means of
expressing feelings and ideas” (216). Carroll’s strategy of synthesis can be applied to
these courses, in order to combine both the form and content of the lessons. Students of
these courses are not taught that the purpose of such repetition is to understand either the
content or the form but (usually) not both, when such lessons should address a synthesis
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of both content and form (in varying amounts, depending on the lesson). Carroll, as
Lecercle notes, explicitly satirizes Latin grammar as an example of such lessons. When
Alice first encounters the mouse in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, she addresses him
based on her experiences with one such Latin grammar book:
“O mouse, do you know the way out of this pool? I am very tired of
swimming about here, O mouse!” (Alice thought this must be the right
way of speaking to a mouse: she had never done such a thing before, but
she remembered having seen, in her brother’s Latin grammar, “A mouse—
of a mouse—to a mouse—a mouse—O mouse!”). (31-32)
Alice, not having studied Latin, misinterprets the purpose of her brother’s Latin book.
Rather than using this textbook to understand Latin grammar, she believes this to be a
lesson on addressing a mouse. Such silly situations were often used to teach grammar.
Unfortunately, if students such as Alice (who, in this situation, has had no interaction
with a teacher) are not taught that such constructions are not lessons but merely examples
of lessons, they have failed to learn how to use knowledge such as Latin grammar.
Lecercle strongly believes that “nonsense and the school interpenetrate. There is
rich nonsense in school life” (216). He cites, as example, how Winston Churchill
described having to learn by rote the declension of mensa (a table) during his first lesson
at Harrow in 1888:
“What does O table mean?”
“Mensa, O table, is the vocative case,” he replied.
“But why O table?” I persisted in genuine curiosity.
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“O table—you would use that in addressing a table, in invoking a table.”
And then seeing he was not carrying me with him, “You would use it in
speaking to a table.”
“But I never do,” I blurted out in honest amazement.
“If you are impertinent, you will be punished . . . was his conclusive
rejoinder.” (qtd. in Lecercle 216)
One can understand Churchill’s confusion regarding the appropriate method for
addressing a table. In this situation, the instructor has chosen not to explain that the form
is the important part, that the table is simply an example, and rather has chosen to
threaten his student into submission, much like the Queen of Hearts accomplishes
through her chant of “off with their heads!” If Churchill’s instructor had been like
Carroll, and favored explanation and justification, Churchill may have better understood
the purpose of his lesson, and by extension the lesson itself. Grammar lessons are a
perfect example of the connection between nonsense and memorization:
There is in fact a strong link between parsing as the core of old-fashioned
education in Victorian Britain, and nonsense as a literary genre. I have
shown that nonsense was preoccupied with the rules of language.
Nonsense is a metalinguistic genre because it has the same goals (but not
the same method) as school education: to teach children the rules of
language (this is why the purity of language is so important, both in the
narrator’s aside in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and in Carroll’s
practice), and more generally the rules of conduct. In the terms of Roger
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Caillois, nonsense appears to give in to paidia, the rule-free playing of the
unruly child, in order to promote ludus, the rule-governed playing that
acclimatises the child to the rules of adult society through imitation and
constraints. (Lecercle 216)
Therefore, nonsense texts act to educate their readers, by forcing them to question the
form and content of such texts. Rote memorization in classrooms discourages questioning
entirely, and thus can discourage true understanding of such lessons in favor of simple
recitation.
The unfortunate result of standardized Victorian education was that students who
were able to memorize their lessons and not ask for additional information were
considered the superior students, because they were understood to have learned their
subjects. Carroll believes that such education did not benefit students as much as an
interactive style of education. Those students of Victorian classrooms that asked for
clarification, justification, or explanation were seen as inferior students, because they
(supposedly) did not understand their subjects and did not follow the rules of the school.
This resulted in a failure to learn, as when Alice first enters Wonderland and encounters a
bottle labelled “DRINK ME”:
It was all very well to say “Drink me,” but the wise little Alice was not going to
do that in a hurry. “No, I’ll look first,” she said, “and see whether it’s marked
‘poison’ or not”; for she had read several nice little stories about children who had
got burnt, and eaten up by wild beasts, and other unpleasant things, all because
they would not remember the simple rules their friends had taught them
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. . . she had never forgotten that, if you drink much from a bottle marked
“poison,” it is almost certain to disagree with you, sooner or later. (22)
Alice does not trust the label that says “DRINK ME,” but she would trust a label that says
“poison.” Alice here only relies on the labels, never considering that a bottle containing
poison may not be labelled as such, or considering why somebody would label a bottle of
poison with the words “DRINK ME” while at the same time include the word “poison”
elsewhere on the label. She contradicts herself, failing to heed the words in front of her
while obeying the lessons told her by her friends. At the outset of Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, Carroll has portrayed Alice as one of those unfortunate students who is only
a vehicle for the conveyance of knowledge and not one who is able to take such
knowledge and apply it to the world, whether that world is Victorian England or
Wonderland. As Alice continues her adventures in Wonderland, however, she quickly
learns to question, adapt, and understand her Wonderland lessons.
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CHAPTER VI
THE INTERACTIVE NATURE OF NONSENSE AND EDUCATION

As we have seen, Lewis Carroll uses parody, satire, and pastiche as tools to
suggest synthesis in and for education. Much of this synthesis appears in the form of
nonsense, and, as Jean-Jacques Lecercle states, nonsense and education were strongly
related in the second half of the nineteenth century. Carroll’s synthesis does not only take
the form of paradox, or multiple contradictory statements existing as truth, but also in the
synthesis of such opposites. This synthesis satirizes the policy that, according to the
operating premises of Victorian education, multiple contradictory responses cannot exist
at the same time. Carroll, then, demolishes binary modes of thought by shifting the focus
of education from the final answer or response, which would either be correct or
incorrect, to a focus on justification and logic, where responses might be both correct and
incorrect but were more often evaluated as strong or weak. In practice, therefore,
synthesis and paradoxes are a significant presence in more successful modes of Victorian
education.
This presence of synthesis appears, through the works of Lewis Carroll, as a
preference for an interactive style of education. When instructors only teach by rote
memorization, there is no true interaction between instructor and student; the two simply
become vehicles for the passage of others’ language and knowledge. Carroll, however,
encourages both instructors and students to question and justify statements, responses,
and answers, in an effort to encourage deeper understanding of the material. The origin of
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Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland stands as a perfect example of this preference; the
novel emerged from an interactive storytelling session between Carroll and the three
Liddell sisters. Such interaction allowed the sisters to create a personal bond with the
story, as well as with its teller, and this is a significant reason for the tale’s enduring
interest among both children and adults.
While Carroll’s fondness for synthesis is not new, opposition to these modes of
instruction persists through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Modern American
educational policy strongly mirrors failed Victorian educational ideologies, with
government policies such as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, a renewal of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, attempting to standardize education
across the United States of America. This Act sought to improve education by focusing
on standardized test scores, mirroring the way early Victorian schools earned their
national funding. In Carrollian terms, these acts sought to ensure that all students
received an education (the binary of yes/no in terms of education), rather than to qualify
the education such students received (the synthesis of strong/weak, where one type of
education can be strong in comparison to a first school, but weak when compared to a
second). These policies do not consider that an extremely poor public education (which
would satisfy the yes binary of such policies) could, in fact, be more harmful than a selfor home-taught schooling or no education at all. Such styles of argumentation mimic
Victorian proponents of rote learning who are satirized in Carroll’s works. Educators who
adopt a Carollian attitude understand these issues, and are able to adapt, to synthesize,
their lessons to meet the needs of various students and educational situations.
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Unfortunately, standardized lessons and testing severely inhibit instructors’ abilities to
make these syntheses. As such educational policies are inherently tied to government and
governmental policy, Lewis Carroll’s satire is thus tied to the satire of one of the greatest
Victorian authors, Charles Dickens, who, earlier, extensively satirized the flawed system
of Victorian bureaucracy.
The importance of synthesis, then, is vitally important in twenty-first century
education, which seems to be returning to the standardized, bureaucratic forms of
Victorian English education. In 1860s Victorian England, students had no access to
alternative forms of education outside of the classroom and the church, with the
exception of those students from families wealthy enough to hire private educators. In the
twenty-first century, alternative forms of education are widely available through
resources like the internet. Educators must concern themselves with engaging students in
the classroom so as not to alienate them from the class and/or school. Rote learning does
not engage students and can, in fact, force them to seek entertainment elsewhere; mobile
phones have made this a significant issue among educators and students. Education
should synthesize new technology with old bureaucracy. If students feel interested and
compelled to respond to an instructor, they are more likely to pay attention and retain
knowledge from their lessons. If not, they often retreat to the internet, either for
entertainment, or for knowledge. Unfortunately, the internet, especially social media,
contains more argumentation that seeks to disprove opponents’ claims than that which is
used to support one’s own position. In order to encourage critical thinking, instructors
should direct students to seek compromise and synthesis, in order to enhance students’
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abilities to form strong, valid arguments. Educators should also encourage nonsense, even
if in the smallest amount, to entertain their students. Such educational beliefs are a
significant reason for the legacy of the work of Lewis Carroll. Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland, in particular, is an iconic children’s tale, due in large part to its use of the
genre of nonsense. The world could always use more nonsense, whether it makes us
laugh, cringe, ponder, or simply shrug off such material. We could all use a break, at
some point, to wonder why a raven is like a writing desk.
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